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Ethnicity, Violence and Democracy
A publication of CCR - Kenya
THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
ABOUT THE CENTRE
The Centre for Resolution, Kenya, is an independent non-governmental organization which is not for profit whose mandate is to seek peace in Kenya by promoting constructive, creative and co-operative approaches to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. CCR constitution states that the centre subscribes to the following main aims and objectives:
For further information contact:
Machira Apollos
The Executive Director
Centre for Conflict Resolution
P. O. Box 16389
NAKURU
KENYA
Tel: +254-37-42851
Email: ccrkenya@africaonline.co.ke
ACRONYMS
APP - Africa Peoples Party
KANU - Kenya African National Union
KADU - Kenya African Democratic Union
DP - Democratic Party of Kenya
SDP - Social Democratic Party
NDP - National Democratic Party
FORD – K Forum for Restoration of Democracy – Kenya
FORD – ASILI (Original)
FORD – People
GEMA - Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association
KAMATUSA - Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu Association
NCEC - National Convention Executive Council
Majimbo - Federalism
Harambee - Lets Pull Together in Unity
INTRODUCTION
Three issues currently dominate debates about conflicts in Kenya. Ethnicity, violence and democracy. Each of these three issues are vast areas of research and academic scholarship and each is characterised by fierce internal debates. The areas where these three concentric circles of interest overlap is a mesh of complex relationships, contradictions and confusion. This study will attempt to highlight some of these relationships and contradictions by examining the unfolding levels of conflicts, ethnicity and democracy in Kenya’s volatile violence prone region of Rift Valley during the last decade. A certain level of generality, assumptions and bias is inevitable in a study of this nature. In a general way, history has shown that to a larger extent, insecurity in the region has been state sponsored and can therefore be induced or removed by the state in the region (Byamukama, 1995). Governments in the region such as Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somali, Tanzania and Kenya should know that there is mutual co-existence even across borders and what affects one may spill over to other states. The collapse of the Somali State saw a spill over to Kenya where many refugees crossed the border and weapons became easy to acquire in Kenya. Banditry has become more prevalent in the north eastern Kenya because of the problems of Southern Sudan and the collapsed Somali State. State managers have to start considering that insecurity in another country can affect their own countries. If people feel completely alienated, they might resort to armed insurgency if the states refuse or fail to resolve conflicts and guarantee security to their people (Byamukama, 1995). The subject of collective security is more complex than it may seem at face value. Political observers, have recognized that whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence.
The textbook example of this trend is Rwanda, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, D.R.C, Somalia, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. This violence has recently been experienced in Kenya. In most of Africa, the transition to democracy has been abrupt and the rulers are not adequately prepared to adapt the wider popular political participation. Social violence; therefore, becomes politicized (Barry, 1991). Political repression and massive coercion have turned plural politics in Africa into warfare (ake, 1990). The last decade of the 20th century in Kenya will be remembered for the armed conflicts, massacres, displacements, uprisings, riots and demonstrations whose repercussions will continue to be felt in the next century.
In the month of January 1998, the world was shocked by the massacre in a few days of Kenyan men, women and children in the valley of death, officially known as the Rift valley. Its conscience was shaken by reports of systematic rapes and "ethnic cleansing" While these horrors are not necessarily new in the annals of human cruelty, they are systematically hidden and trivialized by the state powers that are autocratic in nature. Most weak states in Africa are highly personalized. (Reno, W. 1998), in his arguments about states says that unless the leader controls the insurgencies using his henchmen, it is difficult to control disorganized, decentralized internal guerrillas, adds Reno, (1998) on to this countries such as Chad, Guinea, Guinea – Bissau, Congo – Brazzaville.
The atrocities experienced in these countries need not to be as horrendous as they wont if the state parties respect international laws applicable in situations of conflicts. The law says that persons who do not or can no longer take part in the hostilities are entitled to respect for their life and for their physical and mental integrity. Such persons must in all circumstances be protected and treated with humanity, without any unfavorable distinction whatever.
It is forbidden to kill or wound an adversely who surrenders or who can no longer take part in the fighting. In most Africa, these provisions do not appear to be adhered to. In African wars, the wounded and the sick are not collected by the power that has them for treatment.
Captured combatants and civilians who find themselves under the authority of the adverse party are entitled, under the I.H.L. rules, to respect for their life, their dignity, their personal rights and their political, religious and other convictions. They must be protected against all acts of violence or reprisal. They are entitled to exchange news with their families and receive aid.
Everyone must enjoy basic judicial guarantees and no one day be held responsible for an act he has not committed. No one may be subjected to physical or mental torture or to cruel or degrading corporal punishment or other treatment.
Neither the parties to the conflict nor members of their armed forces have an unlimited right to choose methods and means of warfare. It is forbidden to use weapons or methods of warfare that are likely to cause unnecessary or excessive suffering. It is therefore forbidden to poison wells, dams or burn houses to use poisoned arrows.
The parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare the civilian and civilian property. Most states in Africa have ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions and are, therefore, bound by Common Article III in the four Geneva Conventions and strengthened by the two 1977 Additional Protocols. The study proposes to establish the reasons why state parties to the aforementioned conventions do not adhere to these rules.
This is why it has been found significant to do a thorough study on the causes and extent of this internal violence. My analysis of conflict will be informed, whenever possible, by the awareness that conflicts are waged in diverse settings, often involving multiple parties, and much of my analysis will attempt to take such complexity into account. What many African leaders forget is that the evolution of political authority is a universal process from which many postcolonial African rulers stray at considerable cost. By and large, the law’s provisions are usually sufficient to stop acts of lawlessness in a country like Kenya but perhaps what lacks is the political will to do so. More people have died at the hands of the states in Africa over the last thirty years than have been killed by natural disasters and road
accidents. From South Africa to Algeria, from Eritrea to Liberia, and Kenya the brutal fact is that citizens cannot and do not always rely on governments for protection. Most states in Africa have ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions and are therefore bound by common Article III common in the four Geneva Conventions and strengthened by the two Additional Protocols. The study proposes to establish the reasons why state parties to the aforementioned Conventions do not adhere to these rules.
In recent times, the opening of the political space in Africa has been the origin of far reaching social, political, cultural and economic changes. Political transformations and economic liberalization has increased competitive politics and globalization of the economy(Anyang’ Nyong’, 1990). This has as a result, created the narrow self-preservation need for ethnicity for political survival. Those who hold political power tend to view opposing views as treacherous and treasonable (Ake, 1990). To continue to rule, the rulers terrorize, harass and intimidate the powerless. In some cases, leaders in some countries in this region have eliminated real or perceived political enemies to reduce rivalry. These include leaders such as Samuel Doe of Liberia, Sadat of Egypt, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, Nguema of Equatorial Guinnea. Etc. Those overthrown by popular revolts include Mobutu of Zaire, Dawda of the Gambia, Bokassa of C.A.R, Barre of Somalia, Mengistu of Ethiopia.etc.
This study aims at analyzing the Kenyan conflicts that took place in the Rift-Valley province during the first month of 1998. I shall argue that this conflict is not about such clear-cut issues as foreign oppressor versus suffering locals. The need to deli-militarize the politics of such regimes is at least as urgent as that of military dictatorships. The security agents do not protect the citizens, they demonize them. In recent ethnic or political violence in Kenya, Children were orphaned, Kenyans were widowed, women were raped, people were displaced and turned into internal refugees, people were reduced to beggars and abject poverty. Within the same neighborhood in the recent times, people live in fear of their neighbors, of nightfall, of shadows, of thickets, many months after the episodes of violence. These skirmishes were aimed at systematic destruction of social cohesion in a deliberate way (Hutchful,1992). There is also a systematic demonization that underlies these conflicts. These are what (Hutchful,1992) calls "intimate hatreds" where neighbors fight neighbors.
This abuse of power in conflict of non-international nature has not been addressed by the rules of I.H.L and this perhaps may explain its escalation. A non-international armed conflict means fighting on the territory of a state between the regular armed forces and identifiable armed groups, or between armed groups fighting one another. The conflicts in the Rift valley conflicts may be categorized as internal disturbances which are characterized by a serious disruption of internal order resulting from acts of violence which nevertheless are not representative of an armed conflict.
BACKGROUND OF THE VIOLENCE
The 1991/92 and 1997/98 ethnic violence in Kenya predominantly affected the Rift valley Province, Kenya’s most fertile, expansive and diverse region. In the 1991/93 ethnic clashes some parts of Western Kenya were affected slightly, but these were areas neighboring the Rift Valley. During the 1997/98 violence episodes, some parts of Nyanza, namely Gucha, Migori, Kisii that border the Rift Valley were affected. Secondly and in a very unusual phenomenon, clashes erupted in the Coast Province, far away from the violence – prone valley. This particularly affected the Likoni area of Kwale District. Except for these few isolated though intensive skirmishes outside the valley most of the ethnic violence episodes are concentrated in the Rift Valley. This Province is one of the eight administrative regions in Kenya. The others are Coast, Eastern, North-Eastern, Nyanza, Central and Nairobi Province.
The Rift Valley covers 40% of Kenya’s landmass and was originally the area settled by the white-settlers in the colonial period. During the pre-colonial era, the pastoralists’ communities such as the Maasais, Kalenjins, Samburus, Turkanas, Pokots and the Turgens mostly inhabited this area. Between 1900 and 1915 the natives who lived in most parts of the fertile white highlands were restricted to reserve lands on the peripheries of the region. The fertile lands of Laikipia, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Nakuru were reserved for whites.
This dislocated the pastoralist communities who had settled on this area.
The white settlers introduced large-scale farming and livestock rearing which needed human labour. The pastoralist communities were found unsuitable for offering cheap labour in these areas. They recruited cheap African labour from the neighboring regions of Central, Western and Nyanza Provinces. Thousands of Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya and Luo squatters were brought into Rift Valley Province as farm laborers in early 1900s (Africa Watch, 1993). The issue of land alienation led to the 1952 Mau Mau rebellion led by the Kikuyus in Central Province and the others in the Diaspora. After the 1963 independence, the land issue remained unsolved. The settlers who preferred to migrate back to the countries of origin sold their land to the people on a "Willing - Buyer- Willing – Seller" basis. Because the Kikuyus are traditionally a farming community, they have a great attachment to land. The government encouraged the same Kikuyus to buy farms because the Late President Kenyatta was from that tribe.
INTERNAL STRIFE:
Internal strife frequently presents an aggregate of violent acts and human rights abuses which are interrelated rather than isolated phenomena. A systematic relationship often exists between various types of abuses so that a given practice will create an environment in which other abuses are almost certain to occur.
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law instruments are not applicable in cases of internal strife which fall below the thresholds of applicability of Article III Common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949 for the protection of victims of war and Article 1 of the Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts.
Human rights instruments are either in applicable because the states concerned have chose not to become parties to them or ineffective because of the frequency of the de facto and de jure derogation’s from the normally applicable rights. This ineffectiveness is heightened by the grave inadequacy of non-derogarable rights relevant to situations of violent internal strife. The combined effect of derogations form human instruments the inadequacy of the non-derogable human rights instruments provisions and of the in-applicability of humanitarian law result in a denial of elementary protections to persons caught up in internal strife.
Like many violent episodes around the world, despite the sensationalism of certain accounts of violence in the media, most violent events only receive on-the-spot coverage. There is hardly any attempt to look for explanations and causes for links and patterns (Salmi, 1993). The act of violence is seldom considered in its historical, social or economic context. The standard analysis prefers to short circuit any attempt to undertake meaningful investigations by trivializing the meaning and impact of the event.
One common factor generally encountered in the explanations of the Valley massacres is the excessive individualization of violence. This consists of attributing violence solely to individual factors. Time and again, it is always the individual who is at fault, never the state. Ideological one-sidedness and conventional presentations of violence and human rights violations often display a high degree of ideological one-sidedness. This bias shows itself in the form of over-leniency towards political allies and extreme severity towards groups of people, organizations and countries thought of as political adversaries. This bias is portrayed by the media in the choice of words and expressions used.
It would be wrong to claim that Henry Jean Dunant in the " Memory of Solferino" or the adoption of the first Geneva Convention in the 1864 marked the starting point of International Humanitarian Law as we know it today. Just as there is no society of any sort that does not have its own set of rules, so there has never been a war that did not have some vague or precise rules covering the out break and end of hostilities, as well as how they are conducted.
"Taken as a whole, the war practices of primitive peoples illustrate various types of international rules of war known at the present time, rules distinguishing types of enemies, rules determining the circumstances, formalities and authority for beginning and ending war; rules describing limitations of persons; time, place and methods of its conduct, and even rules outlawing war altogether". The first laws of war were proclaimed by major civilizations several millennia before our era.
"I establish these laws to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak" (Hammurabi, King of Babylon). Many ancient texts such as the Mahabharata; the Bible and the Koran contain rules advocating respect for the adversary.
The 1864 Convention, in the form of a multilateral treaty, therefore codified and strengthened ancient, fragmentary and scattered laws and customs of war protecting the wounded and those calling for them.
VIOLENCE: THE COMMON PATTERNS
In most of the violence that has occurred in Kenya during the last decade, there are common patterns that took place in this period. First, ethnic violence flares up in areas where previously there has been no serious friction between diverse communities. This is usually preceded by persistent cattle-rustling and general theft by the actors of violence. Ethnic hatred and suspicion is created. Accusations and counter-accusations between the diverse ethnic communities take place. At an unexpected moment, full attacks, which are fast and simultaneous, are done with precision. The victims of violence go on revenge missions and repulsion. According to this authors personal account the attackers move in columns – local vigilantes or guides are always in front; these are mostly the youth, followed by a frontline of raiders equipped with arrows and bows and the last platoon comprise attackers with rifles. As the raiders take stock of their previous engagements and wait for nightfall to resume attacks, ordinary communities of different tribes target each other fiercely. A spiral effect is set in motion. Some tribes, burning with vengeance, go on arson sprees hacking their perceived enemies indiscriminately. Women in the Laikipia plains who accompanied the raiders went on stolen donkeys that they used to carry the booty. In some areas like the Njoro violence, the tribes waited for each other on the roads flushing them out of public transport and hacking them mercilessly to death. Others in the Ravine area were thrown to crocodile infested rivers and dams. In this situation it becomes a free-for all encounter of revenge. Many people are displaced and a long exodus of populations leave for safer destinations, mostly the churches. In this initial stage columns of women and children are the first groups to be evacuated, followed by the transportation of household effects including livestock. Men stay on hoping that the violence will come to an end. When this is not possible men also leave the area. The reports of the attacks are remarkably similar Mr. Khalif a founder member of Safina Political Party said before the Akiwumi Judicial Commission on Political Clashes in Kenya;
"The attacks are well coordinated and the ability for the raiders to acquire weapons raised suspicions. He argued that the failure by security forces to counter the raiders’ onslaught was a clear pointer to the government’s involvement" (Daily Nation, 29th Sept. 1998).
The independently owned print media, usually the Nation newspapers in the first instance, report the orgy of violence. The Government characteristically through the electronic media, usually the KBC denies the violence occurrence and accuse the church and the media of blowing the episodes out of proportions. The press continues to report with tangible evidence such as photographs, narratives and personal interviews. When reporting persists, the areas are declared security operation zones to bar the press and international observers from visiting the sites and collecting tangible evidence. This happens in all areas affected by violence. Police reinforcements come in too late after the raiders have almost nothing left to attack – villages looted and residents displaced. With nothing else left attackers now engage in an orgy of looting, clearing possessions of deserted homes. Even the sight of policemen does not scare these raiders confirming the fear that they are state sponsored. This happened in Ndemu Ndune of Laikipia, Stoo Mbili in Njoro area and Kwale in Coast Province.
One respondent, Mrs. Monicah Wambugu, whose nine heads of cattle, two donkeys and three goats were stolen was quoted as saying:
"We informed the police immediately the raiders stole our animals because the police were patrolling the area in a mahindra police car, but instead of following the route the raiders had taken the police went in the opposite direction despite our protestations. Eventually they returned to their station 12 kms away. They came after two days to ask for money to buy fuel for the government landrover, for food and for beer. We gave them but they did not go far to pursue the raiders. They came for more money the following day but we did not have any. They left for the station, never to return again" (Interviews).
In most ethnic violence episodes, the mayhem usually lasts a few days but the cost in both human and physical terms is horrendous. Within a week of Likoni violence in August 1997, 61 deaths were reported and thousands displaced. On January 17th 1998, more than 45 deaths were committed in one day in Laikipia plains. On 28th January 1998 in Njoro area, more than 61deaths were reported over one weekend and thousands of people, men, women and children were displaced.
After the raid, murders and destruction, a lull or a non-violent period occurs. People mourn, pray, bury the dead, count the losses. Rhetoric begins. The politicians from both the ruling party and the opposition parties engage in name-calling, condemn each other, verify and raise war cry. A surprised international community expresses some concern and appeals to the government to stop the massacres and resettle the displaced. A reluctant government reluctantly sends a face-saving Police force to restore peace with strict instructions not to shoot anybody, the actors of violence included. When the police arrive, some actors of violence are arrested. Victims of violence who organized revenge or retaliatory attacks are mostly sought. They are arrested and their vehicles impounded. Members of the KAMATUSA tribes are treated well by the criminal justice system. They are given bonds and their cases dismissed faster. The other cases drag on for months and years but eventually for lack of evidence and effective human rights representation, the cases are withdrawn as a public relations exercise. A case of oathing in Ndurumo village of Laikipia by 47 people took three years to complete and the accused persons were found innocent. The arrests, investigations, prosecution and trial appear like they are stage-managed by the state for international consumption.
As the international community begins aid resettlement programs the Head of State makes a hurried official, high profile visit to the area and declares there is no violence. In the Laikipia episodes he stayed a record of 45 minutes trying to reconcile the communities.
The President and those in-charge of internal security visited both Laikipia and Njoro genocide areas a month after the killings, despite the fact that Njoro area is 20 kms away from the President’s regular home and State House. On these visits, his message is usually to demonise the victims of violence, castigate the opposition post and an anti-stock theft unit to be set up in Sipili Trading Centre. Almost one year after the disturbances he ordered community-based "Peace Talks" and chose the peacemakers who are bent on the ruling party of philosophy of "Divide and Rule". Since the clashes in 1991 it took the president eight, long years to order a judicial commission of inquiry into the Tribal Clashes of 1991/92 and 1997/98.
In retrospect, the spontaneous reaction of violence occurs after a prolonged frustration period when a precipitating incident occurs that sparks off mob hysteria, or communal madness leading to mass destruction, murder, rapes, maiming and looting. It is my assertion that the Rift Valley violence is a complex web, weaved together by perhaps powerful politicians destined to dismantle peace and victimise innocent citizenry for their own selfish, short term political gains. Given its fragile ethnic and political mix the Valley is the ideal place for dirty politics. When this issue is raised in Parliament it is most likely to promote fights. After the 1991/92 clashes Parliament appointed a Parliamentary Select Committee of inquiry to investigate the causes and identify the perpetrators of violence. The report, headed by Hon. Kennedy Kiliku, a former Member of Parliament was rejected by the same parliament that had appointed it. The report had blamed the government and high ranking state functionaries for starting and perpetrating violence all over the country. In Parliament, this invoked hostility, walk – outs and condemnation. The Parliamentary Report confirmed the earlier reports by the mainstream churches and non-governmental organisations, that the clashes were politically motivated by the government. Many people agree that the clashes had nothing to do with land but politics. In Likoni, Kwale violence:
"Those who suffered were poor kiosk owners who had no influence to grab land" says Prof. Alamin Mazrui, the director of Kenya Human Rights Commission (Daily Nation, 29th Sept. 1998).
It is a synethis of this study that whenever violence erupts, a skein of excuses, double-speak and outright lies cloud the real issues and what emerges is a story about co-existing communities suddenly targeting each other. On the ground local leaders peddle land differences as the source of conflicts.
Another hypothesis that will be proved in this study is that violence usually precedes general elections in Kenya. Testimony has it that the clashes are meant to influence voting patterns in the Presidential and Parliamentary elections.
"In a large number of cases elections have merely "constitutionalised" existing authoritarian regimes, military as well as civil, with former dictators donning a thin mantle of democracy. In formerly single party states such as Kenya, Cote’d’evoire, Gabon, and Cameroon, the official party has re-emerged as the official dominant party within the framework of political pluralism....." (Hutchful, 1997, pg.6). These regimes set the election rules and go ahead and administer them. It is no wonder that they have to win these elections. This has happened in a number of countries including Mali, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. In this particular case the Kenya’s political scene is full of contradictions and surprises. The state sometimes, after intense external pressure concedes to liberalisation, freedom of press, amnesties but soon after the Bretton Woods institutions release the necessary funds, the state retrogresses into its former autocratic self. It muzzles the press, detains activists, and puts pressure on civil organisations to toe a certain line of thought. This re-awakens more dissatisfaction which sometimes leads to mass protests which turn violent sometimes. Whenever Kenya is in civil strife, the President makes a quick regime rearrangement which temporally cools tempers. When the national mood returns to normal the President continues with his old, well known autocratic rule. The Kenya’s regime may be likened to a chameleon that changes colour according to the environment but remains basically a chameleon. The Akiwumi Commission had testimony to the effect that government feared the emergence of the National Convention Executive Committee (NCES) as a major impetus in the reform process posed a threat.
"At this point in time, the government felt threatened by the forces of change and was compelled to act accordingly. It had to come up with a counter-offensive and the outcome was the clashes" said Mr. Khalif to the Commission (Daily Nation 29/9/1998).
This will be developed further to show that despite forehand knowledge authorities do little to forestall the massacre. It will also be further shown that the wars are never between Kikuyus and Kalenjins, Kikuyus and Samburus, Masais and Kisiis, Luos and Kisiis but between politicians. Ordinary people across the ethnic divide find themselves ensnared in a trap they will never fathom. The violence turns tribal when some tribes revenge against their other tribes and in so doing forcing tribes to retaliate and engage in an orgy of violence. The government of Kenya is bogged down by the complexities of securing a peaceful nation-state. First, it deliberately advocates for an unworkable unitary state while putting effective mechanisms for a federal state. Quietly, the "divide –and –rule" tactic is used to polarise ethnicity and demonise politics that are in opposition with the ruling party, KANU. This negates the often repeated saying by the late President "United We Stand – Divided We Fall". The KANU constitution contains a unitary system of governance but its leaders openly preach "Majimboism", (a form of federalism).
It would seem that, despite its declared commitment to security and development, both broadly defined, the state does not have the political will or the skills to conceptualize and operationalize security, "nor the vision to look beyond economic growth to full or multidimensional development as its priority" (Schoeman, 1998, pg. 18). The government’s objective of security and development on paper is not reflected in its approach to security and development. Another tangible evidence to show that the government is unwilling to secure peace in the areas that have lost peace is the lack of development of programmes that would ensure peace and development. The idea of a time-frame is associated with strategic approaches towards realising goals and objectives. The government has said, over and again, that resettlement efforts of the clash victims will take place but over the years nothing appears to happen on the ground. Efforts by the mainstream churches and non-governmental organisations to resettle and rehabilitate the victims of ethnic clashes has often confronted a hostile government attitude. A UNDP- Government initiative to resettle people was bogged down by tedious administrative bureaucracy that made the programme impossible to continue. Another complexity of Kenyan as an African State is alluded by Cornwell (1998) says she says; "... the African state is weak and tends to put short term political survival before long term and sustainable development needs ...."
There is a large gap between the state’s stated goals and its actions on the ground.
THE CAUSES OF CONFLICTS
One of the causes of conflict in the country as in the contemporary Africa is bad governance and marginalisation of the citizenry. Political power is used as a means to have access to scarce resources. The resistance is made by the citizens and the state power is applied to maintain the status-quo. There are certain types of states that are favourable to violence.
Most people think of violence in terms of wars, murders, riots and crime. According to Salmi (1993) violence is "any act that threatens a person’s avoidable actions that constitutes a violation of a human right". There are several types of violence. Direct violence refers to acts of deliberate violence resulting in a direct attack on a person’s physical or psychological integrity. This includes all forms of homicide including genocide, communalcide, ethnocide, war, murders as well as all types of coercive or brutal actions involving physical or psychological integrity. This may include forceful removal of populations, maltreatment, etc. Another type of violence is indirect violence or violence by omission. This is non-assistance to person’s in danger. Passive behaviour or inaction to assist clash victims in times of danger is very common in Kenya. Another common type of violence in this study includes repressive violence. This relates to three groups of fundamental rights such as the right to vote, the right to assembly, the right to fair justice, etc.During the last decade, Kenya has undergone a series of profound political metamorphosis culminating to the multi-party politics in Kenya, which resulted to serious political power struggle between different political leaders. During these times the power brokers preyed on their ethnic backgrounds to drum up support for their own political advantage. Though ethnic violence did not start in 1991 in Kenya during the introduction of multi-party politics, it is this period that saw widespread ethnic cleansing that caused thousands of the population displaced from their homes. According to Human Rights Watch (1993) the motive for the violence appears multifold, first, to prove the government’s assertion that pluralism would not work in the country and that it would lead to tribal animosity. Second, to punish ethnic groups that are perceived to support the political opposition, namely the Kikuyu. Luhya and Luo. Third, to terrorise and intimidate non-Kalenjins to leave the Rift Valley Province and allow Kalenjins to take over the land through intimidation and violence (pg. 91). The bulk of this ethnic cleansing took place in the expansive Valley that cuts Kenya into two. At the heart of the matter lies the deeply engrained pattern of social inequality and exclusion within the Kenyan society. This refers not only to the problem of widespread poverty but to the overall syndrome of systematic exclusion from formal livelihood resources (land, work, wages) from public welfare schemes, from political participation and even from the nation as a collective social and cultural construct. This exclusion is based on various combinations of class and ethnic divisions, and is further complicated by the persistent significance of potential ties that can determine whether one is in or out in terms of effective citizenship. The emergence of a strong civil society and an overbearing opposition political parties made people have a rapidly expanding achievement expectation of better life. People were made more hopeful as the state conceded to the waves of democracy calls. In periods of rapidly expanding achievements such aspirations can sometimes outstrip reality. People expected complete democracy, employment, improvement of income levels and when this was not forthcoming in the newly emerging democracies, there is bound to be discontent, anger and conflict. Conflict is most likely to occur after a period of expanding achievement if there is a slowdown or, reversal in this achievement. Mass demonstrations have happened
in Kenya after the 1991general elections because the state did not fulfil its stated promise when it came to power. Ethnicity appears to play a lead role in political conflicts in Kenya. According to Nnoli (1989) ethnicity is a "social phenomena associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups". Ethnic groups are social formation distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries. The relevant communal factor may be language, culture or both. In Africa, language has clearly been the most pervasive and crucial variable. However, as social formations, ethnic groups are not necessarily homogenous entities even linguistically and culturally. The case of Somali is an example of this. Ethnocentrism is also associated with the interaction of ethnic groups. It is therefore , often confused with ethnicity. Ethnocentrism is attitudinal in forma and perceptual in content. It represents the subjective dimension of ethnic behaviour. Ethnic hostility even among individuals who have not met face to face, as well as ethnic loyalty and identity are passed on to successive generations through the process of socialization. Ethnicity is often manipulated by those in control of state power or aspiring to control it in order to further their political objectives. That the consequences of such manipulation may be detrimental to the population at large may be of very little interest to these politicians (Nnoli 1989). There is usually the mistaken assumption that ethnic diversity brings with it political instability and the likelihood of violence. Some of the world’s most ethnically diverse states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan, though not without internal conflict and political repression, have suffered little interethnic violence while countries with very slight differences in language or culture such as Somalia, Rwanda have had the bloodiest such conflicts (Browen, 1996). In the Kenyan context, the desire for national cohesion was clearly illustrated by the "Harambee" (let us pull together) slogan but unfortunately this has now been abused by the successive governments. The experience in Kenya show that unless ethnic contradictions are correctly and quickly resolved they tend to have adverse consequences for positive communication, mutual understanding and co-operation in the society. Associated with these contradictions are calls for federalism.
When and where these problems exist it is difficult for the members of the society to work co-operatively in the pursuit of their interest. Ethnic conflicts have a high potential for causing a break of the society into splinter groups and formations. Ethnicity was propagated by the colonialists to dampen the revolutionary potential of the African proletariat. They also used it to hamper African nationalism in general. Hey employed it as a mechanism to divide the colonized, and, therefore, rule over them. They encouraged communal sentiments among Africans. In Africa, the petty-bourgeois political line on ethnicity is characterized by philistinism, opportunism, narrow mindedness, prejudice, chauvinism, particularism, discrimination and exclusion (1989). The selfish ambitions of a few are put forward as ethnic interest. In this way, communities are set one against the other. They are told that their communities are being finished, marginalised, discriminated against and are advised to protect themselves from outsiders. People are made to believe that their problems are due to exploitation by the other tribe. When groups rather than individuals are in the throes of conflicts, several additional mechanisms come into play. Group support can make people more confident of the legitimacy of their aspirations enhancing the likelihood of conflict. When several tribes with similar interests begin to talk with one another, they may begin to develop and pursue new aspirations, which can lead to conflict with others whose interests are opposed to these aspirations. Such a result is particularly likely if they begin to identify themselves as a group apart from other groups. For intergroup conflicts to develop, a sense of group bonding is needed. One of the most important sources of bonding is common group membership such as GEMA or KAMATUSA or political associations. The political exploiters want to bridge only those gaps in government institutions which advance their narrow class interests, which they mask as the interest of their various ethnic groups. When one of the members of parliament’s land was invaded by some people in Njoro he mobilized the people saying that it was the community that was the target, and not him as a person. When the President attained power he was threatened by the strong ethnic associations that were there and he quickly outlawed them all. Conflicts is more common in relations between groups than in relations between individuals who do not see themselves as sharing a common group membership than in relations between those who do (Rubin, J. Z. 1994).
Politics of poverty and exclusion jeopardize "social citizenship" and in the long run work against democratic consensus and stability. Relative deprivation has two effects; first, it alerts party to a conflict to the existence of incompatible interests. Second, the frustration and indignation associated with relative deprivation are a source of energy which increases the likelihood and vigor of coping activity. If those victimized feel offended, this energy takes the form of anger, which is particularly likely to produce contentious action (Runin, etl al 1994). This is now happening in Kenya. If relative deprivation continues, a sense of hopelessness may develop. This usually diminishes conflicts behaviour and, hence, overt conflict. People adjust their life expectations downwards and hope for a miracle. People increasingly turn to religion and escapist ways for comfort. This has happened in the present Nigeria, Sudan and Somalia. The areas that have been affected by most violence are the ones where the neighbor pastoralist regions. At the community level, there is a general level of mistrust and suspicion between pastoralists and agriculturists communities. There is a belief that the other is hostile or indifferent to the other’s interest. There is also a general belief that pastoralists communities are uncivilized, illiterates. Uncouth and live in the lifestyle of yesteryears. This is reflected in their houses, clothes and their lack of education. These communities resent these labels and tend to be angry when it is implied by the others. This is a source of conflict, even in times of relative peace. Pastoralists in Kenya have suffered greatly, particularly where drought has been compounded by other misfortunes, such as lack of security. In these communities a person stripped of stock is stripped of most active social relationships and thereby of self-hood and self respect; so it is no wonder that almost everyone strives to keep some stock, and that those fortunate few who have incomes from elsewhere invest in more livestock. Due to pro-longed ethnic frustrations and social injustices a whole range of outbursts of social violence may occur, leading to the erosion of the capacity of the state to uphold the principles of justice, rule of law and inclusionary citizenship. This dimension of the livelihood and security of a large number of Kenyans casts a shadow over the consolidation of democratic politics. What is worrying is that once these insurgencies erupt they appear very difficult to control. Conflicts escalate because each tribe thinks it is more powerful than the other. The Kikuyus of Laikipia had the mistaken belief that their numerical strength reflected power and could overpower the Samburus immediately. The Kalenjin warriors in most of the Valley originally thought it is very easy to displace the other communities from their homelands. This has appeared tricky and difficult. Experiences in many parts of Africa show that the terrain of insurgency is very complex and control by conventional armies is impossible (Hutchful 1993). The cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone attest to this. This is more so applicable in weak states where control at the centre becomes disjointed. According to Hutchful, 1998, these new conflicts are typically occurring in poor, marginal states, lacking in appreciable economic or strategic resources. The insurgencies are disorganized without a common centre of gravity to which the combatants appeal and in many cases, it is not clear that the insurgents have any interest in or intent on gaining political power or responsibility. The Rift Valley conflicts appear confusing because they are disjointed and have no clear vision in their violent episodes. They are usually led by "an obscure and nihilistic leader, sometimes with no political organization or political agenda" (Hutchful, 1998). Zartman (1995) has described a state as the authoritative political institution that is the sovereign over a recognised territory. It is an institution that makes decisions. It is a guarantor of security for a populated territory. A state collapses when it cannot perform the basic functions of a state. Collapse means that the basic functions of a country are not performed. Laws are not made, order is not preserved, and society cohesion is not enhanced. When this takes root it lacks legitimacy to govern. The state is a social contract entity where individuals give up their entities for the mutual existence of all. They bestow power to some other body of persons. When these cannot effectively rule, they are and should be replaced with others. State collapse involves the breakdown not only of the government superstructures but also that of the societal infrastructure. A point to note is that the collapsing of a state is not a short-term phenomenon. It is not a crisis with a few early warnings or simply a matter of a coup or a riot. State collapse is a long-term degenerative disease (Zartman 1995). Its outcome is not inevitable. Cure and remission is possible. Many countries have almost collapsed but they eventually take balance and begin the process of development. Classic examples of this include a nation like Uganda. It is possible to predict with a certain level of certainty that a state will move in the direction of collapse unless certain elements of good management of the institutions of the state are put in place. An independent regime, which is ruled and stays in power for a long time wears out its ability to satisfy the demands of various groups in society. Resources dry up, either through internal waste or corruption, social and ethnic groups feel alienated, excluded and marginalised causing an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and opposition which in turn draws increased repression and use of police and the military to keep order. State collapse is marked by the loss of control over political and economic space. The two effects work on opposite directions. When countries are nearing collapse other neighboring countries take advantage over the weakening structures and involve themselves in its politics directly and by hosting dissident movements who play politics from neighboring sanctuaries. The currencies of the stable neighbors are used extensively. This has happened very much by the Somalis in the present collapse of the Somalia state when they use the Kenya shilling or the US dollar.
When a state is about to collapse there are several states that a country undergoes through. First, the power base at the centre is ethnicized and the smallest clique at the centre takes over, forgetting the broader community. There is intensive infighting by the inner power brokers and a lot of witch-hunting. At this stage the incumbent practice only defensive politics. Elections are postponed and the leader occupies his time attacking those who are opposed to his policies. The rulers are afraid of losing power. They become paranoid and intimidate people to coerce them into submission.
"The prevalence of highly centralized governments, rule by single men surrounded by cliques of courtiers, constitutions reduced to paper documents, cowed judiciaries, easily disposable laws, ubiquitous and intimidating security services, large and inefficient state bureaucracies, restricted freedoms of thought, assembly and organization and widespread corruption are just some of the characteristics that many African systems share with the fallen regimes of Eastern Europe (Johnson, R. 1990, pg. 17). The existence of sharp fault lines of potential civil conflicts in many third world countries renders it important that political changes be introduced systematically rather than precipitously.
Kenya is made up of over 40 different ethnic groups ranging in size from a few hundred to more than a million members (Human Rights Watch, 1993). The major tribes include the Kikuyu who comprise about 21% of the country’s population, the Luhya 14% and the Luo, 13%, Kamba 11%, Kalenjins 11%, etc. When Kenya became independent in 1963 the first President was a Kikuyu who led the KANU political party. The other parties, namely KADU and the APP were not so strong. The APP was a Kamba Party led by Mr. Paul Ngei while the main opposition party, KADU, was a conglomeration of the smaller tribes who advocated a federal form government. This was meant to avoid a situation whereby the bigger tribes would not assume total control of governance. After a brief period of independence the other political parties decided to merge with KANU to make Kenya a de-facto one party. President Kenyatta solidified his rule by appointing his tribesmen in all the major government ministries including the Military, Defense, Finance, the Police, Education sector, Land and all the important sectors in the civil service. This is obvious that the Kikuyu benefited from Kenyatta’s rule. Apparently, ethnicity started before the attainment of independence (Babu,1991). When Mr. Moi assumed power he systematically dismantled what the late President had done for over 15 years. He directed his development efforts in promoting the Kalenjin tribe. He supplemented this by giving some favours to the small tribes. President Moi’’ cabinet is dominated by the Kalenjins and KAMATUSA tribes. In the provincial administration, Kalenjins are the most despite the fact that their population is not that big. Political observers at this stage in Africa’s political development have said that;
" We no longer see the rise of a bourgeois dictatorship, but a tribal dictatorship. The ministers, the members of the cabinet, the ambassadors and local commissioners are chosen from the same ethnological group as the leader, sometimes directly from his own family........ This tribalizing of the central authority, it is certain, encourages regionalist ideas and separatism. All the decentralizing tendencies spring up again and triumph, and the nation falls to pieces, broken in bits"(Fanon, 1968, page. 183-84).
It appears that leaders in the Third World deliberately refuse to learn from history or from experiences from their neighboring states. They live on day-to-day compartments without any thought for future or for tomorrow. Regimes of minority ethnic domination which are maintained by violence can only be radically changed by violence. The laws in these societies are maintained to keep the status quo and can not be reformed voluntarily. Leo Kuper (1980) has said that a privileged group will not voluntarily renounce its privileges. Hence, reforms will only be introduced under pressure, and the response of the ruling group is to resist this pressure for as long as possible, and to concede the very minimum. In consequence, if reforms are introduced they are invariably too late to be acceptable, and too modest to be significant. Inherent in minority or ethnic domination are contradictions which heighten the antagonism between the groups, and render inevitable the result to violence. The deprivation of economic exploitation foster revolutionary challenge, social exclusion and inferior status create bonds of solidarity among the surbodinates, cultural repression and denigration stimulate a cultural renaissance (1980). There is a high probability that societies with a long minority domination will resist reforms, sabotage reform process and only change partially and retract the changes at an opportune moment. That is what has been happening in Kenya. Change agents must know that the rulers will not make significant concessions under its own initiative.
Experience from other countries show that those who ignore their populace eventually fall sooner or later. Siad Barre in the 1990’s had concentrated power into his clan and this prompted his overthrow. Samuel Doe of Liberia concentrated power in his hands and his ethnic group and this too prompted his downfall. Mobutu Sese seko of the former Zaire became an autocrat and he fell by the wayside when the wind of change could not sustain is rule any more.
By 1990 when Kenya’s movement to the road to democracy intensified the ruling party decided to advocate ethnicity for political mileage. Many Kenyans thought, perhaps wrongly now, that under democracy, there are competitive politics, that parties must be free to take their messages to the voters, that some independent media and associations should be allowed. When Kenya moved from one party to multi-party democracy, ethnic patterns developed along party lines. The ruling party, KANU led BY Mr. Moi became a party of Kalenjins and the minority tribes. Mr. Oginga Odinga dominated the FORD Kenya party, which was mainly associated with the Luo – Nyanza tribesmen. The more populous Kikuyu dominated two political parties namely; the Democratic Party, DP and the FORD Asili Party led by Mr. Mwai Kibaki and Mr. Kenneth Matiba respectively. There were other small parties that did not affect the voting patterns significantly. Due to the fragmentation of the many political parties and the flawed nature of the 1992 elections, KANU won by a minority vote of 36%.
This scenario repeated itself in the 1997 General Elections when the ruling party, KANU, once again retained power by a narrow margin. This time round, thee were five main political parties and a host of many small ones. There was Moi’s ruling party, KANU, which managed 113 representatives in the House against a combined opposition vote of 108 members of parliament. The runners-up of the Mwai Kibaki led DP, Charity Ngilu’s Social Democratic Party (SDP), Kijana Wamalwa’s FORD Kenya and Raila Odinga’s National Democratic Party, (NDP). What is unique about these political parties is that they are tribal based. Since Moi has only a small democratic margin in parliament he now deals with co-operation pacts with other opposition parties to remain in power. These patterns breed suspicion, animosity and hatred (Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1991, Samir, 1990). The phenomenon of violence within tribes and regions is reported as a particular problem of serious concern in this country. All this is attributed to politics of ethnicity. Hutchful (1998) calls them "Ethnicization" of political parties in countries. Ethnic conflicts have been used by African leaders as a pretext to limit or avoid political liberalisation, and once again power-sharing have used ethnic conflict. Mr. Daniel Moi has created an ethnic electoral base that excluded most Kikuyus, increasing the relevance of ethnicity in politics and therefore the level of intergroup tensions (Bowen, 1996). What the myth of ethnic conflict would say are ever-present tensions are in fact the products of political choices.
One of the major causes of conflicts in Africa is because the African state was constructed under contradictions. There was no original consensus on state formations and this has meant structural contradictions in terms of language, cultures and even religions. The third world countries were often left with totally artificial borders, which the colonial powers had drawn up without regard for previous delineation or for any ethnic, cultural, geographical or economic logic. The new borders instead served the colonial needs for administrative control and economic exploitation. It is widely believed the root problem of the African state is the artificial nature of its boundaries which were arbitrarily drawn up at the Berlin Conference of 1884/85 and then imposed from the outside. Many states as they exist today, with exemptions such as Ethiopia, are a legacy of colonization. The colonial state was above all a military state. The colonized people were intimidated into submission and when this was relaxed, the British colonizer used indirect rule that imposed colonial traditional chiefs to rule over their subjects. These were more despotic and this arrangement continues today, alienating the citizenry to their rulers, even at the local village levels. This brings about conflicts. Because one of the main objects of colonial conquest was the control of primary resources, the colonial state was organized in such a way as to ensure the conditions required for economic exploitation of the colonies. In Kenya, the colonial state allocated the best lands in the Highlands to themselves and excluded the indigenous tribes who roamed the expansive areas as pastoralists and hunters. This appears to have brought about the present day conflicts.
THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IN KENYA
The re-introduction of pluralism politics in Kenya brought with it some problems that could not have been foreseen. To sound the danger, the president had predicted that Kenya was not ready for pluralism and said that people "will fry themselves in their own fat" immediately after this statement, ethnicity, mistrust, suspicion was emerging slowly and eventually led to violence.
Violence affected the political space in Kenya. Democratic infrastructures were frustrated deliberately throughout the country. Political rallies were disrupted by the police and KANU youth – wingers. People who settled in the great Valley were displaced and could not, therefore, register for voting in the then forthcoming elections. The violent episodes mostly affected areas that were perceived to be strong opposition strongholds. President Moi apparently wanted to punish those who did not vote for him. This is a habit that is practiced by weak states which are under the control of warlords and tyrants. Experience has shown that weak states eventually lead to warlordism, examples like Somalia, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc... it is easier to lead by warlordism than democratic leadership. This is because the basis for patronage eludes democracy. Weak state rulers have a tendency to commercialize politics. The process of privatization is used to strengthen his power and loots the economy for his own gain. He uses state finances to fortify and discipline his won forces. He uses liberalization as an excuse to marginalise economies and broaden social forces. He and those close to him buy state corporations that are mostly profitable. Structural adjustment programs marginalise whole populations in a deliberate way. This is usually a political strategy designed to benefit a few politically correct tribes or communities. According to Reno (1998) this puts resources in the hands of weak men. A weak ruler becomes a warlord himself without knowing that he is a warlord. From 1991 to 1998 President Moi has presided over a weak state. The structural adjustment programmes which eventually led to pluralism had as their original good intentions, advocated for less government. The World Bank ads the International Monetary Fund called for trimming of the government institutions such as the civil service, state corporations and cost-sharing economics in public welfare services such as health, education, social services etc.. Unfortunately the effect of these adjustments has contributed to less government in form of exclusion, nepotism and ethnicisation of power. Those who are retrenched in Kenya’s civil service belong to the "wrong" tribe or opposition – dominated areas of the country. State corporations are sold to the politically corrects foreign firms that advance the political base of the ruler. In Kenya, the majority share holding in Kenya Airways, Oil Companies, Newspapers and Airwaves are owned by foreign firms related to the power brokers in KANU. The East African Standard Newspaper owned by Lonrho and the son of the president is a case in point. In the farming sector, the mainstay of the country, the Coffee Board of Kenya, the Kenya Tea Development Authority, the Kenya Farmers Association, the Kenya Creameries Co-operatives, the National Cereals and Produce Board are dominated by State functionaries to an extent that they are deliberately mismanaged in favour of KANU.
The effect of re-introduction of pluralism and violence has therefore led to a broad marginalisation of people in weak states such as Kenya. This is usually deliberate for sustenance of power. This shows that there are warlords in civil societies. This violence has benefited the government politically. The government has been able to polarize ethnic sentiments to ensure that the KAMATUSA communities have no choice but to support the Moi regime. Rift Valley has 44 seats in Parliament and this is important for Majimbo advocates.
Secondly, because of the violence, many people left their farmlands and their homes. The Valley massacres succeeded in the localization of diverse communities. People hate, fear, evade and suspect the government in any undertaking. They have formed community vigilant groups for their protection, rediscovered kinship lineage, clannism, ethnicity, villagenisation for solving their own everyday problems. People live in a state of preparedness for any adverse eventualities and do not expect any government assistance in times of trouble. They could not produce farm produce or go on with their daily economic activities. Food rotted on farms and other ready, stored food was stolen. Houses were burnt. This brought up general poverty across the region. People who had big businesses migrated to urban areas depriving the rural areas the much needed business services to these areas. People who wanted to begin businesses hesitated and motivation went very low. Once an area is affected by violence, the inhabitants’ lives are indefinitely disrupted. Continuing attacks prevent a return to the land (Africa Watch 1993). This insecurity affects development. Conflicts take time and energy away from other pursuits. A group or country can become so embroiled in controversy that it is unable to cope with basic development issues. The link between security and development has not been studied enough (Solomon and Shoeman, 1998). This statement is as true in Africa as it is in the rest of the world. Development in this concept is used to connote economic growth terms. This is the ability of a society to generate and sustain an annual increase in its gross national product in real terms. In this regard, development is measured without regard to equity, distribution of wealth, etc... In the Rift Valley concept, development will also refer to those visible physical infrastructures that are put in place as the society moves from one state of development to another. This is in terms of roads, schools, hospitals, cattle-dips, houses, etc... in terms of development, an area lags behind during a period of violence and a long time thereafter. In Rift Valley Region, many schools were affected by the clashes and some children left school altogether, never to go back. Considering the abject poverty and often extreme levels of deprivation suffered by the majority of small-scale farmers in Rift Valley, and the fact that much of this deprivation is caused by political mismanagement of the national domestic product and the internal conflicts, the need for stability and peace-building mechanisms becomes all the more important. It is often suggested and assumed that security is a prerequisite for development (Schoeman 1998).
That there can not be development without security is as true as it can be. It may also be true to say that there can be no peace without development. If there is peace (the absence of conflict), there is likely to be development, or social change that is positive. It is noted that social systems operate best in peace times. In situations of conflicts, schools close and many children do not attend schools. Children are predominant in the rural areas and in war situations as victims. In refugee camps children outnumber adults at the rate of six to one. In Laikipia and Njoro clash areas, the violence has been traumatizing to the children. Some were witnesses to the death of their parents and the destruction of their farms. The education of the displaced children is inconsistent, expensive and eventually leads to termination or truancy. Differential association has led to many children leave school and get into child labour. Competition in normal schools with stable children has led to displaced children performing badly leading them to play truancy and eventually indulge in delinquency behavior, which leads to poor personal growth.
Thirdly, in a situation of social conflicts, there is a breakdown of law and order. The genocide or ethnocide, the rapes and physical abuse of the victims of violence make people mistrust the state; the police and the institutions of power. A general militasation of the youth takes place. The youth are encouraged to disobey, take up arms and protect their communities. Globally, it has been noted that the youth are predominant in the sphere of violence. This is particularly noticeable in warlordsm and liberation movements. The text-book examples of this include Uganda, Somalia, Liberia, Zaire, Sudan, Sierra Leone and the insurgency in Kenya. Why are the youth very crucial in the nationalist movement? First, the youth are structurally more available in terms of radicalism, idealism, attachments and are therefore, ready for mobilisation. Unemployment, idleness and youthfulness is also a contributory factor. The youth population is over 50% in any society, and they stand central in the crisis of social reproduction in Africa. They are marginalised and there is usually a generational crisis. The youth militarism in the urban areas has been contributed by the cultural and social upbringing of them and the disintergration of the extended family systems. Access to higher education with the resultant frustration thereafter due to unemployment, alienation and exclusion lead the youth into militarism. The Rift Valley experience show that the reasons why the youth indulge in violence is that they are easily manipulated, they are radical, intelligent and excluded. Exclusion and alienation refer to denial of social participation or opportunities to enjoy are more involved in deviant behavior, drugs, alcohol, and other vice. In Rift Valley the Kalenjin "warriors" and the Maasai "morans" are made up of young males aged between 16 to 35 years. They are the ones charged with the responsibility of cattle raids. Their victims who go on revenge missions are also in the same age category. The youth contribution in violence can not be underestimated. There are advantages to the warlords in recruiting the youth in armed conflicts. The child soldiers sense of fear is low. War is an adventure for them. It s a form of pride. Children learn very quickly. In times of war, children are less suspected. In democratic transition societies, leaders use the youth as political activists. The long –term effect of the youth involvement in violence is a set-back to any conflict transformation efforts that may be introduced in societies that have had conflicts. Indoctrination, mentacide and psychological warfare are deeply implanted in the mind of the youth at their prime period and this may take a long time to de-construct. The genius of violence is that it disempowers in such fundamental ways that its effects cascade out in many directions and for a long time to come. With violence we can diminish human prospects systematically in every conceivable direction. The pity of violence is that with it we weaken the very thread out of which we weave the fabric of who we are, as individuals, communities and cultures.
Fourthly, the general poverty that has prevailed in the clash areas is another social impact of violence. Those who migrate to urban centres live in squalid, unhygenic camps, without proper food, water, employment, privacy or proper sanitation. They become internal refugees in their own countries. Their deserted lands are occupied by the invading raiders and a compromised government does little to assist the displaced persons. When some eventually return to their farms, the find it looted. They are chased away by the raiders again and again. The farms are destroyed, houses are burned and materials stolen.
The governments response to the violence has been characterised by inaction towards the perpetrators of this violence and the demonising of the victims violence. Those who attempt to assist the victims are castigated by the state (Africa Watch 1993). The Catholic Church at Sipili, Ol-Moran and Njoro were castigated for allowing their compounds to be regufee camps for the victims of violence. The Non-Governmental Organisations who want to help area asked to channel their assistance through the same government that encouraged their attack. In many cases eye witness accounts report that the police and the provincial administration stood by as people were massacred. When asked why they can not arrest the perpetrators of violence, they claim that they are under strict instructions not to shoot anyone. The few junior officers who attempt to prevent violence are reprimanded and may be transferred out of station. Once the first round of violence is over the senior police officers and the provincial administration personnel are transferred out to safer regions that did not experience violence.
There are many reasons why governments must try to contain conflicts within societies. Whenever problems occur, people regard themselves in micro-entities for comfort and security. This re-introduces ethnicity, clannism and fanaticism. Some countries and peoples are being developed backwards into the last century due to paternalism, mismanagement of state power and ethnicity. Internal wars arise out of intensely parochial issues. This is as a result of multiple cracks in the system of power.
"Although many African leaders talk about development, it is not in their political agenda" (Ake, 1990).
When violence occurred in Coast Province, many tourists canceled their trips and this affected tourism in the country. Many people also left their businesses as a result of the clashes. Underdevelopment in Africa is related to lack of democracy. Political repression and massive coercion have turned politics in Africa into warfare. Leaders are besieged by a host of hostile forces they have unleashed through their coercion.
PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Bearing in mind the need to address the general crisis associated with current patterns of development, more specific policies may be needed for countries that are divided by ethnic and religious cleavages. The main issue here is usually equity. Many ethnic conflicts or grievances can be traced to the way different opportunities accrue to groups in the social economy, discrimination and/or inequalities in jobs, incomes, assets holdings and social services.
One of the major redistribute efforts that can be made is the concept of proportionality in governance and other advantages. The other one is the affirmative action to the marginalised groups. Proportionality ensures those jobs, political appointments, educational opportunities and public investment programmes are distributed in ways that reflect population ratios. This involves use of quotas, subsidies and special funds for disadvantaged groups. Since the new forms of violence may be traced to structural problems such as high levels of unemployment, poverty, and exclusion, and the generational crisis of the Kenyan youth, are turning to mass riots and crime as a subsistence hobby because of diminishing opportunities for employment, education and self-realisation. These problems are sharpened by the failure to address fundamental governance issues such as police brutality, human rights abuses, tyranny, etc.
The second, though similar to the first, seeks primarily to redress imbalances created by discriminatory practices, often of a historical nature. Policies of Affirmative Action have encountered a number of difficulties in many countries. Redistributive policies face additional problems of entitlement. Favored groups may come to believe that this favor should be permanent and withdrawal of it leads to opposition and resentment. This is what has now happened to the KAMATUSA ethnic groupings. In parts of Laikipia, the land is being given out discriminatively to the members of the Turgen tribe. This has created passive conflicts which may later turn dangerous. Redistributive policies are essential in bringing about reconciliation, a sense of national belonging and political stability in unequal plural societies, but they will need to be carefully formulated and monitored if they are not to fuel the conflicts they seek to prevent. The idea of the nation states is of recent origin. In the Past, people tended to identify with smaller units of a village , municipal or clan type.
Other ways of bringing harmonisation of nation states include among others the following;
The principle of majoritarianism in its undiluted form, is simply unsuitable for governing deeply divided societies (Adekanye 1998). This is the principle of rule by the winning political party without any accommodation of the others. Majority party in elections versus the opposition bases this on the principle of "winner –take-all" or the rule of majoritarianism". To produce civil peace, in deeply divided multi-ethnically segmented political settings, democracy, must adopt non-majoritarian principles of power sharing.
Power sharing is therefore preferable as a strategy of conflict reduction and as a principle of governance in deeply divided societies such as Kenya. Power sharing has several basic characteristics.
States that have experimented on the power-sharing strategy include South Africa, Uganda, Mozambique, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Angola and Niger.
Deutsch (1957) who creates the following criteria propagates another secure community paradigm;
What the above criteria seem to conclude is that there should be education and emphasis on the responsiveness of communities. A shared history of co-operation, inter-marriage, infrastructures etc. which bring mutual dependence is necessary as this would be conducive to the development of mutual sensitivity and the desire to work towards a common, peaceful future. For a good peacebuilding transformation to take place, the government should emphasise on human security rather than the security of the State.
This should be "an all encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the process of governance, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being" (Hutchful, 1998).
An important element of conflict resolution which is often ignored by a majority of countries are the international instruments already put in place and ratified by the same countries of the world. In a situation where conflicts are inevitable, the best way forward for states is the respect for international conventions which are very comprehensive in ameliorating situations of armed conflicts and the protection of civilians and their properties in a period of war. In the 18th Century, JEAN – JACQUES ROSSEAU made a major contribution by formulating the following principle about the development of war between states:
"War is in no way a relationship with man but a relationship between states, in which individuals are enemies only by accident; not as men, nor even as citizens, but soldiers (.....) since the object of war is to destroy the enemy stated, it is legitimate to kill the latter’s defender’s as long as they are carrying arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrender, they cease to be enemies or agents of the enemy and again become mere men and it is no longer legitimate to take their lives".
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols 1 and 11 should be respected in situations of war. The First Geneva Convention addresses the problems of combatants who are fighting in the field or on land while the Second Geneva Convention addresses the problems of armed conflicts on the sea and high waters. The other two conventions deal with the problems of those combatants who have surrendered and laid down arms and are therefore treated as prisoners of war while the last one deals with the civilian populations in situations of armed conflicts. What these treaties try to do is to civilise conflicts so that minimum unnecessary damage may occur where conflicts become inevitable.
Other international instruments that try to address the issues of conflicts between nations is the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights of 1948 and the 1968 Tehran United Nations Convention on Human Rights which recognises the importance of having civilised wars where such wars are found inevitable. Moreover, all State Parties to United Nations covenants on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are obliged to respect the human rights provisions that prohibit torture, arbitrary arrest and deprivation of life. This convention guarantees equality before the law and protection of all persons without regard to race, sex, colour, religion, class, nationality, political affiliation or any form of discrimination. State parties have a duty to preserve this and where violations have occurred to commence and institute administration of justice. If this is done uniformly and transparently, people’s confidence with the administration of justice will be enhanced and this will lead to respect for rule of law. This brings peace. In a period of relative peace, there will be a consolidation of democracy, the achievement of social justice, economic development, and a safe environment, and a substantial reduction in the level of violence and political instability.
From the religious perspective, when people attempt peacebuilding and conflict transformation in diverse societies, efforts should be made to apply the Buddhist view of resolving conflicts. The Buddhists believe that conflicts have a co-dependent origination and mutual cohesion and, therefore, there are no single actors. To resolve conflicts, therefore, there should be shared responsibility in the causation of conflict and joint problem solving mechanism should be applied. Sir Isaac Newton observed that for each action there is an equal and opposite reaction. The political clashes in Kenya, for example, are a multi-faced problem with many actors and blame should not be laid to one particular group. The fighting groups must be having a reason why they fight and it is this origination that should be discovered and redressed. If the minority tribes feel oppressed or excluded from the Valley that claim it is their native land, on the one hand, and the others who feel that property ownership is free in this country’s constitution, this should be addressed.
A more advanced conflict resolution mechanism from Judaism has it that dialogue is continuous. It has no beginning and no end. Even in situations of relative peace dialoguing must continue at all levels at all times. It appears that conflict managers have a lot to borrow from religion. The Islamic view states that there should be responsibility well-being for all.
The Christian faith insists on forgiveness and love for neighbours. If all people proscribed the Christian’s ten commandments peace would prevail in the world. From traditional perspectives, to prevent conflicts the Department of Culture within the government should promote existing "cultures" of peace within different ethnic communities. There are some traditional symbols of peacemaking tools within some tribes such as honey, milk, beer, grass, feathers, doves, green twigs and some ceremonies that promote love, peace and unity. In situations of conflicts efforts should be made to promote these. These should be enhanced because the present forms and types of violence prevailing across the globe are not determined by the past forces of the cold war situation. The present insecurity prevailing in most of the third world is intra-state.
"No longer are conflicts and threats to security confined to the international arena and to military aspects" (Schoean, 1998). In the present Kenya the nation-state has been so centralised that everybody’s life evolves around the state. Village-based conflict resolution mechanisms should be encouraged with active participation of the respectable community leaders. The present prevailing arrangements where the village chief leads any community initiative may not be the best solution. Within communities, an addition conflict resolution mechanism that should be promoted is compensation of stolen or destroyed properties.
Another long lasting solution to power mistrust is to democratise the office of the local chiefs. This solution as adopted by the Uganda’s National Resistance Army in the Luwero Triangle was to democratise the local state by dismantling the system of chieftainship, by turning the chief into an administrative officer supervised by an elected village assembly of all adults in the village, whether indigenous or not.
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Theodor Meron (1983) "on the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument, 77 American Journal of International Law (AJIL 589)
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ABSTRACT
The study focuses on ethnic violence which have rocked various parts of Kenya since the re-introduction of political pluralism in the country in 1991.It argues that in a democratic state all people and institutions should shun violence.
The study thus discusses the genesis, cause, course and implications of violence in the Kenyan politics. It points out that the roots of the violence can be traced to social, economic, political and historical factors.
The violence has led to heavy loss of human lives, destruction of property as well as dislocation of populations.
On the whole, the study posits that since Kenya is a multi-ethnic state there is need to nurture a democratic tradition, which recognises cultural and political diversity. This should be a panacea to any possible future ethnic conflicts.
The study concludes that there is urgent need to ensure that ethnic contradictions in Kenya do not explode out of proportions. The methodology of the study included both oral interviews and documentary data.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.0 Theoretical considerations……………………………………………. 48
3.0 Historical background………………………………………………… 48
4.0 Ethnicity and politics: an overview…………………………………… 50
5.0 The state and violence………………………………………………… 52
6.0 Genesis and causes of violence………………………………………… 56
7.0 Perpetrators of violence………………………………………………… 58
8.0 Effects of violence……………………………………………………… 59
9.0 Recommendations……………………………………………………… . 61
10.0 Conclusion…………………………………………………… 62
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………… 63
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The use of violence for political ends, whether by individuals or the state, is a major feature of contemporary Africa. Yet, violence appears to represent the very antithesis of democratic pursuit, which undoubtedly is the hallmark of democratic states.
In the past few years, democracy has made historic leap forward in Africa. However, many daunting challenges and obstacles still persist which threaten its consolidation. These impediments include among others, the problem of violence and ethnic conflicts, which are major constraints to democratic governance.
The re-introduction of political pluralism in Kenya in 1991 has led to an upsurge of political and ethnic violence. These have caused deaths, destruction of property as well as dislocation of populations. In addition, they have contributed to a situation of insecurity and breakdown of law and order.
The government appear not to have acted decisively to contain the initial violence, which claimed over one thousand lives within eight months, most of who were perceived as supporters of the political opposition. This act exposed the government to accusation of complicity in the mayhem. The perpetrators of the violence seem to have become emboldened while the victims felt exposed, let down, and marginalised by the very government that should guarantee them security. In the end, ethnic feelings have tended to become more entrenched at the expense of national unity.
This work, is a study of ethnic conflict and violence in Kenya. It argues that the violence which has rocked Kenya since the advent of multi-party politics in 1991 was political. The violence was politically orchestrated and not a spontaneous reaction. The study explains why the violence erupted in 1991 and 1998, and shows why it was concentrated largely in the borderlands of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces. In addition, the study identifies the possible causes of the mayhem, as well as showing the link between ethnicity, politics and violence. Furthermore, it offers suggestions on possible resolution to ethnic violence in the country.
In general, the ethnic conflicts in Kenya were the inevitable consequences of the unresolved political and economic contradictions aggravated by a seemingly partisan political system, which was obsessed with ideological and sectional interests at the expense of national interests.
The work has as its focus of study, areas of Kenya which have been hit by ethnic and political violence with emphasis on the borderlands of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western provinces. The region has been adversely affected by violence since 1991. The area is populated by a diversity of people from different parts of Kenya who for a long time have co-existed, peacefully. The zone is agriculturally well endowed and much of it was incorporated in the white Highlands, an area alienated exclusively for European settlement, during the colonial period.
In order to address seriously security issues in relation to violence, it is imperative that the entire system in which conflicts are occurring be solemnly addressed. This would help us to unearth and identify the root causes of violence.
It is worth-noting that violence is often regarded to be wrong not only because it deliberately inflicts harm upon the innocent and violates rights of persons but because it represents the adoption of non-democratic means to socio-political ends.
2.0 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The study on violence, security, law and order in contemporary Africa is timely as it is prudent, urgent and incumbent upon all forces geared towards the much desired democratization of the continent, her people and institutions.
Since the quest for the restoration of political pluralism gained momentum in the early 1990s, the Kenya government has been put in a dilemma. No sooner was the agitation for multi-partyism and democratization ushered in 1991 than political violence erupted.
The study adopted the approach of political economy to show the significance and implication of violence to the future of Kenya as a nation in particular and Africa in general (Anyang - Nyon’go 1987, Berman 1992, Nzongola - Ntalaja 1997). It argues that ethnic and political violence could be exacerbated in Kenya if the people remained obstinately irrational, unrealistic and unresponsive to the currents of historical change, political and economic realities and contradictions.
The institutionalization of violence tends to impede the much-needed benefit of democratic co-existence consistent with the new global political thinking and democratic consciousness.
The study points out that many African leaders have tended to use state power and institutions to promote their own interests or those of their ethnic groups. This is achieved through intimidation, violence and other forms of havoc against real and imagined enemies. The violence in Kenya is seen in that light. Indeed, the building of a new democratic society seems not to be the major concern of African leaders, whose primary inspiration is to capture and retain state power.
The study, therefore, establishes that violence can not inspire the much sought after democratization, rule of law, accountability and democratic governance so pertinent for political pluralism, which the majority of Kenyans crave for. The study was conducted along historical, dialectical and political planes so as to identify opportunities necessary for the formulation of sound political policies vital for economic stability, social cohesion and rapid democratization of the country.
3.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Currently there is increasing academic interest in the apparent breakdown of law and order characterized by ethnic conflicts in much of Africa.
According to Bridge Bryne (IDS Bulletin, 1996,35) the end of the cold war has exacerbated rather than lessened violence and conflict in Africa. Ethnic conflicts and violence characterize the current political situation in Kenya. Following the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1991 there has been a spate of ethnic violence in various parts of the country, especially in the expansive Rift Valley Province. The first phase of violence started in 1991 as Kenya was preparing for the first multi-party general elections in a period of twenty- five years. It appears that the violence was based on a desire by some personalities who felt that their individual and communal interests were being threatened by the unfolding political developments (Economic Review, August 15, 1992). These personalities wanted to perpetrate their entrenched political hegemony by whipping up ethnic solidarity. Indeed, they wanted to derail the democratization process then in vogue by instilling fear among Kenyans, thereby minimizing the peoples’ identification with calls for popular and participatory democracy, including pluralist politics.
According to the opposition parties in Kenya led by the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), the violence was hatched up by the state as a way to prove its contention that multi-partyism would not work in Kenya and instead would breed ethnic violence. Opposition leaders contend that had the government lost the 1992 election, the violence would have been elevated to full scale civil war to further prove the point, and possible ensure continued power for the ruling clique. This argument seems to support Hannah Arrendt’s assertion that violence appears where power is in jeopardy but while power without violence is conceivable, violence without power is impossible (cited in Frey 1991,253).
When the Kenyan government moved in to contain the volatile situation it appears to have been unequivocally partisan. Moreover, it did not pursue the so called ‘Warriors" (attackers) with vigour at all. Consequently, no mastermind of the violence has been arraigned in court on charges related to the mayhem. This shows the state’s failure to offer security to its citizens. In a democratic state, it is the government’s basic responsibility to protect and defend the life and property of every citizen irrespective of tribe, race, gender, creed or political persuasion. A government that abdicates this cardinal responsibility loses the moral authority to govern (The Jurist 1998,3).
Instead of resolving the conflict the government started to look for scapegoats. For example, it blamed the opposition and by extension the victims. Political observers contend that if the instigators of the violence did not have state support the violence would have been contained within a few days. Yet the mayhem continued for eight months unabated and still tends to erupt on and off. This shows that the state, in one way or another, was giving tacit support to the aggressors so as to achieve some political objectives. Such partisan intervention served to aggravate rather than curtailing the violence.
Frey(1991) posits that political violence is a tactic used to gain control of a situation or to shift balance of power (1991,116). This is achieved through manipulation of target population into compliance with demands they would otherwise reject in a more rational situation.
According to Lomasky, perpetrators of political violence though unknown as individuals are known to be acting as agents of some group of people whose political purpose provide the stimulation (ibid. 119).
If the Kenya government was sincere then such instances of lawlessness should not have been allowed to escalate. The state should have acted promptly and decisively to create normalcy. This would have in turn deterred other people from planning similar incidences in the future.
Consequently, since no stern action appear to have been taken against the perpetrators of the 1991 mayhem, another wave of violence erupted in February 1998.
4.0 ETHNICITY AND POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW
Kenyan Politicians have continued to trade accusations as to the causes of the political or ethnic violence in the country. Both the government and the opposition are blaming each other, for having instigated the mayhem, in order to gain political mileage. In June 1998, the government appointed a Judicial Commission chaired by Justice Akiwumi to investigate the causes of the violence. By the time of compiling this work the Commission had submitted it’s report to the government, which is yet to make it public.
It is worth noting that during the clamour for political pluralism spearheaded by the church and the civil societies, the government warned that multi-partyism would breed inter ethnic conflicts since the people were not yet cohesive enough. However, due to incessant pressure from the foreign donors and the International community who had cut off economic assistance to Kenya, the government softened her stand and repealed Section 2A of the Kenya Constitution, thereby legalising the formation of other political parties to compete with the then sole party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU).
The colonial government’s policy of ‘divide and rule’, which was compounded with that of the creation of exclusive ethnic reserves led to the institutionalization of ethnic consciousness and bigotry. Very little attempt was made by the colonial state to create a Kenyan nation from the myriad ethnic societies; instead each ethnic group was encouraged to become inward-looking. Indeed the state discouraged and prohibited the formation of nation- wide political parties but rather allowed the emergence of ethnic and District based political associations. All such measures made it difficult for Kenyan people to have a common front in the fight for independence.
Kenya is made up of over 40 different ethnic groups. The major groups are Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin. During the struggle for independence two major national parties sprung up. These were the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The large and more advanced Kikuyu and Luo dominated KANU while KADU was a party of the small ethnic groups such as Kalenjin, Luhya and Mijikenda.
KADU pursued a philosophy of ‘Majimboism’ (regionalism) which would allow semi-autonomous regions based on ethnicity to have substantial decision making powers. The
Central government would in turn have a limited and defined federal role. KANU on the other hand favored a strong unitary government. During the Lancaster House Conference of 1962 KANU accepted the KADU fronted ‘majimbo’ Constitution so as not to delay the country’s independence. Thus in December 1963 Kenya achieved independence. The country was divided into eight autonomous regions, each with its own Legislative Assembly
Thus KADU favored a system which encompassed an amalgamation of multiple centres tribal political groupings. ‘Majimbolism’ is derived from a Kiswahili word for region or regionalism. In historical development in Kenya, majimboism, regionalism and federalism have all been used interchangeably in defining a political structure based on ethnicity. According to Prof. Kibwana ‘majimboism or regionalism refers to a political system or organization in which the country is divided into semi-autonomous regional units as presided over by weak governments which in practical terms resemble local government authorities (1994,1). In other words, such government can be seen as being ‘ a half way house’ between a centralised state and federal state.
The majimbo constitution was the brain- child of the minority settler and Asian communities who felt that it would safeguard their interests and aspirations, especially on the issue of land. British colonial rule in Kenya had a profound effect on land ownership in the Rift Valley. For example, it established relations between ethnic groups that altered the ethnic composition of the Rift Valley. African labourers were recruited from Nyanza and Central Provinces to work in the plantations. Moreover, thousands of squatters, especially Kikuyu, settled on the European farms where they offered free labour in exchange for limited cultivation and grazing rights.
By all accounts, KANU’S rule under Jomo Kenyatta was dominated by Kikuyu nationalism, political and economic control of all spheres of life. For example, the Kikuyu with government support managed to buy either individually or through land buying companies nearly all the former white settler owned plantations in the Rift Valley. A small number of Luo, Luhya and Kisii also purchased some land. When President Moi (a Kalenjin) took over the mantle of state leadership following the demise of Kenyatta in 1978, he adopted policies which tended to promote disproportionately privileges to the Kalenjin elite. As Jean Bayert, would put it - ‘politics of the belly’ or the culture of eating became more pronounced.
Ethnic politics and violence seem to have resurfaced with the advent of political pluralism in Kenya in 1991. The violence adversely affected Kenya’s most fertile region of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces. The Rift Valley covers 40% of Kenya. The farms, which were acquired by non-Kalenjins, in the Rift Valley are at the centre of the violence. The Kalenjin are laying claim on all land in the province based on the so-called rights of previous ownership of those lands in the pre-colonial times. The Kalenjin are venting their anger on the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Abagusii whom they view as supporters of the political opposition. Thus the violence is a form of ethnic cleansing.
Oyugi correctly argues that tribalism as an ideological tool is often used in economic competition and political conflict (AJPS, 1997). This assertion seems to confirm what happened during the 1992 elections when the Kalenjin and their kinsmen opted to defend the status quo of privileges, against the possibility of deprivation by potential challengers. This marked the genesis of ethnic violence in Kenya.
Magubane (1969) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997) correctly points out that the condition for ethnic conflicts in Africa was created historically through colonial and post-colonial government policies. The bone of contention in African ethnic conflicts is control of the state and national resources to which the state has access. Thus the state is both a contributor to, and the manager of, ethnic conflicts. Such conflicts tend to erupt because of the activities of either the elite or groups who mobilize ethnic symbols in order to achieve access to social, political and material resources. Ethnicity, therefore, is instigated by scarce resources.
Similar views are held by Ibrahim and Pereira (1993), and Mafeje (1971) who point out that under colonial rule linguistic groups were categorised as tribes and the differences between them were emphasized. Thus stronger and more rigid ethnic relations became possible. However, with the multi-ethnic states of Africa, ethnic based political mobilisation, constitute a major threat to the stability of the state.
In sum the entrenchment of democratic culture is the panacea to ethnic conflicts. This is because ethnic conflict can be linked to the failure of democracy to entrench itself.
5.0 THE STATE AND VIOLENCE
The state stand accused for its complicity in one way or another in the ethnic violence in Kenya. This is due to its acts of omission and commission.
From the very beginning the state’s response to the violence was lukewarm. The government and the local administration attempted to play down the conflict by blaming the opposition and the mass media for sensational reporting. Initially the government had claimed that the violence was merely conflict over land (Daily Nation ,October 31, 1991).
Consequently, little was done to deploy adequate security or provide any meaningful assistance or relief to the victims. Those sent to quell the clashes appear to have been partial and biased. In many instances the few security forces were out numbered by the ‘Kalenjin warriors ‘ hence their incapacitation. The policemen are reported as pleading with the attackers not to burn and loot rather than stopping them from carrying out their heinous acts. Available evidence shows that the police were acting under strict orders not to shoot at the warriors. Thus the ‘warriors, attacked with impunity even during day time regardless of the presence of the police. Furthermore, some policemen who had acted against the ‘warriors’ are said to have been interdicted, dismissed or charged in court. What an irony!
In addition, the warriors appeared to have been familiar with the movement of the security and other administrative personnel and hence were able to strategically arrange attacks when security personnel were out of the area for other operations elsewhere ( Kiliku Report 1992). There appeared to have been evidence of cordial interaction between the warriors, security forces and administrative officers. The police, therefore, were reluctant to arrest the perpetrators of the mayhem. On the contrary, the police tended to release without charge suspects who were handed over to them by the victims (Africa Watch,
1993). The government instead adopted selective policy in apprehending the `warriors’. Very often non-Kalenjin were arrested and arraigned in the court on charges of possessing illegal weapons which they had acquired for self defense.
The government it seems wanted to gain political mileage in the clashes hence the use of violence as a political tool. State involvement was evident in its inability or unwillingness to take adequate steps to contain the volatile situation. For example, the government response to the violence was characterised by inaction towards the attackers and outright hostility, against those who attempted to assist the victims hence the accusation of state complicity (African Watch, 1993).
The violence was linked to the transition from one party dictatorship to multi-party system. Thus it is likely that the violence was instigated by the state to prove its stated assertion that multi-partyism would lead to ethnic conflict since Kenyans were not yet cohesive. The violence therefore, was not a spontaneous response. As the NCCK report states.
To make it worse, police and administrative officers often ridiculed the victims with two finger salute saying " let the FORD help you’ (Daily Nation March 7,1992,3). In general the local administration and security personnel was largely Kalenjin who would conceivably be expected to side with their tribesmen. This seems to support Kumar’s contention that frequently the police and the military are the exacerbaters not the resolvers of conflict in multi-ethnic societies (Kumar 1990,4).
The violence, therefore, can be seen as strong-arm tactics used by the state to intimidate recalcitrant opposition supporters. The violence seems to have benefitted the ruling party and the government politically. For example, the government was able to polarize ethnic sentiments thereby ensuring that the KAMATUSA have no choice but to support the system. Moreover, the state used the violence to reward and empower its supporters by allowing them to alienate or buy land illegally in Rift Valley Province (Africa Watch 1993,7).
In addition, the ethnic polarisation and violence were used to destabilise areas from which the opposition parties was expected to garner massive support during the 1992 General Elections in the country. It was also used to punish ethnic groups which supported the opposition, hence the use of violence as a political tool.
The fact that the state of lawlessness in the country continued for a long time was a clear indication of the state’s unwillingness to contain the situation, for political expediency. The government only took cosmetic action by deploying security forces in the clash torn areas to ward off internal and international condemnation and criticism. The state at the same time has never undertaken a sustained program of action leading to a political solution to the violence, though a Judicial Commission was appointed in 1998, seven years after the initial clashes.
Although the violence was potrayed by the government as purely ethnic or tribal its basis was clearly political. It is worth noting that the KANU government and the ruling Kalenjin Community has stood to benefit economically and politically from the mayhem. The violence therefore appears to have been a manifestation of the government’s adoption of new methods to retain power. This was aimed at circumventing the rule of law and undermine the process of political pluralism [Africa Watch, 1993, 12]. The call for Majimboism was an attempt by Kalenjin KANU stalwarts to forestall the re-introduction of political pluralism in Kenya. As one KANU member of Parliament defiantly stated: "We are saying that unless the clamouring for political pluralism stop, we must devise a protective mechanism by leveling this movements" (Daily Nation, September 9, 1991, 12). The call for majimboism therefore was a charade and a camouflage for ethnic cleansing of the so-called non-indigenous communities in the Rift Valley Province.
Thus the Kalenjin leaders portrayed the demands for political pluralism and multi-party system as anti-Kalenjin movement and an affront to the Kalenjin Presidency. Moreover the Kalenjin have the perception that the major ethnic groups look down upon them. Thus
they feel justified in reclaiming the so-called lost land. As one old Kalenjin sums it: " at independence (former President) Jomo Kenyatta gave all the land to the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin got nothing, so now the Kalenjin must take "land back" (Africa Watch 1993,88). Bayert points out that in contemporary states, ethnicity exist mainly as an agent of accumulation of wealth and political power (Bayert 1993,55).
The Kalenjin through propaganda had been made to believe that in case of power going into the hands of a non-Kalenjin, they would be isolated persecuted, marginalised and victimised for imaginary crimes (Daily Nation, January 3,1992,14). This political indoctrination encompassed the inculcation of the belief that a single party system was more protective to the Kalenjin than political pluralism. In that regard, if pluralism was to exist then the Kalenjin’s hope would best be served in the creation of a separatist state or federalism, which would preserve Kalenjin’s areas as semi- autonomous.
The indoctrination gained momentum in the series of political rallies held by KANU leaders in 1991 where the virtues of federalism were extolled. The advent of multi-partyism was seen as a challenge by the power brokers who had monopolised the political and economic scenes for two decades. These leaders therefore started advocating for the revival of anachronistic ethnic loyalty and consciousness. In such a scenario, rather than providing an opportunity for self determination multi-partyism was seen as a threat to their claim to run as an ethnic community. As Oyugi observes:
"The Kalenjin therefore covertly and even openly used emotive ethnic symbols and preyed on alleged ethnic conflicts of interests as means of mobilising mass support for their own selfish and class interests" (cited in Okwudiba, 1995, 18).
Available evidence gives credence to this. The Kenyan government’s action (or inaction) contributed to the exacerbation of ethnic consciousness and to some instances the explosion of ethnic contradiction into violence.
In Africa, the state is the determinant in the production and distribution of material and social resources. Consequently, there is strong competition for political power since access to state apparatus is the key to the acquisition of material and political resources
(Markakis 1994,220). In that connection, those who control the state would not hesitate to use state power to defend their privileged position. Kenya is no exception to this.
The 1990s demands for political pluralism in Kenya engendered an environment of fear, anxiety and animosity. G.K. Kuria notes that:"Kenya’s majimboism is not federalism. The central theme that it advocates have pursued is power at any cost. They are disinterested in democratic theory of federalism, which divides power between the centre and the region. Indeed these advocates supported one Party rule and did not show interest in federalism until September 1991 when they realised that the impending pluralism threatened their hold on power (1994,2).
For example, the District Commissioner of Uasin Gishu, one of the areas adversely affected by violence is reported to have remarked at a public meeting that; ‘in Kenyatta’s day, if a Luhya had said something against the Kikuyu he would be killed, so now why should Kikuyu say things against the Kalenjin?’ (Africa Watch, 1993,26).
It is worth-noting that in Africa, access to state power for various groups is regarded as a welcome opportunity. This is because of state control of almost all aspects of economic and political spheres. Hence the propensity of each ethnic group mobilizing its people to ensure or safeguard that access. This in turn inevitably heightens ethnicity and ethnic consciousness. Nnoli (1989)clearly points out that once a class dominates state power, it organizes itself and society in such a way as to establish and perpetuate control over this power, and use it to pursue these interests. To a large extent ethnic sentiments and identity were manipulated for political ends in the ethnic violence in Kenya.
The selfish ambition of the ruling elite and the petty-bourgeois were presented as ethnic interest as a general struggle for the survival and well being of the community. Thus the struggle for political power was interpreted in ethnic terms (Nnoli 1989,4). As Nnoli correctly states: "an ethnic consciousness thus increase in scope and intensity, the socio-economic and political atmosphere becomes charged with tension" (1989,66).
Six months after the onset of the violence the President of Kenya is reported to have described the clashes as ‘mere acts of pure political thuggery’ and warned that "the Government would not condone the use of force as a political weapon" (Daily Nation, March 21, 1991,l). Despite this warning, the violence continued unabated. This seems to
support Harry Ekstein that ‘the state is neither an arbiter nor neutral: - it is itself a focal point of competition; an actor in the conflict’ (cited in Kumar 1989,3).
The state therefore appeared unwilling to quell the ethnic conflagration. The state thus appears to have allowed act of lawlessness to flourish in order to accommodate chauvinist whims of individuals. When the state is unable to provide security and safety to its citizens such a state loses it credibility and legitimacy.
With the advent of political pluralism, there was strong feeling that some communities such as the Kikuyu had advantage in their number and economic power. The Kalenjin on the other hand possessed political power. This fact tended to create power struggle, especially between the two ethnic groups.
According to Jonathan Glover, those who use violence for political purpose are those in power or their agents (cited in Frey 1991,257) State instigated violence is aimed at preventing change in the status quo. The strategy of instigators of state sponsored violence is to inspire target population with terror by means of random acts of violence. Moreover, a government that lacks popular support tends to turn to violence in an attempt to bolster support.
The first acts of violence erupted on 29th, October 1991 at a settlement farm in Nandi district on the border of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces. Within a few days the fighting escalated taking an ethnic dimension. The Skirmishes later spread to several districts in the region including Kisumu, Kericho, Kakamega, Uasin Gishu, West Pokot, Bungoma, Nakuru and Trans Nzoia. This area constituted about 51% of Kenya’s population. The motives of the violence appears to have been manifold; to prove the government often stated assertion that political pluralism was synonymous to ethnic chaos; to punish ethnic groups that were perceived to support the political opposition; to terrorize and intimidate non-Kalenjins to vacate the Rift Valley Province, Kenya’s most fertile region; and to allow the Kalenjins to posses, and occupy the land through intimidation and violence (Africa Watch, 1993).
In addition, the violence seems to have been the outcome of renewed calls by Rift Valley KANU politicians for the introduction of majimboism based on ethnicity.
The violence erupted soon after calls by high ranking Rift Valley politicians in a series of public rallies, for the creation of ‘majimbo’ system of government in Kenya. This was a kind of Federal system of government based on ethnicity or regionalism. These Politicians also called for the expulsion of all non-indigenous ethnic groups of the Rift Valley. Under this policy of ethnic cleansing the Province was supposed to be the preserve of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA).
A senior Minister, Nicholas Biwott made a revealing statement at one of the meetings, which clearly spelt out the political angle to the conflict. He stated that; " Kalenjins are not cowards and were ready to counter any attempt to remove them from leadership" (Daily Nation, September 22, 1991,1). He also warned the multi-party proponents saying that such people should vacate the Province:"Let them keep quiet or else we are ready for the introduction of Majimboism whereby every person will be required to go back to his motherland’ (Ibid.: 23).
In that connection the Kalenjin could be viewed as the instigators of the violence. As one Minister whose people suffered heavy casualties in the violence openly stated: " I have told you, the common denominator in these clashes is the Kalenjin, with violence directed at the Luhyas, the Luo, and the Kisii and later the Kikuyu’ (Daily Nation, March 17,1992,12).
Thus it can correctly be pointed out that following the demands for political pluralism the KAMATUSA politicians felt threatened by the possible loss of power hence the genesis of ethnic violence.
It is worth noting that authoritarian rule has the tendency to embody injustice and inequality in inter-ethnic relation. Hence such leaders assertion that political pluralism is bound to attenuate ethnic conflicts. Yet only democracy is hallmark in tackling the prejudice and discrimination that bedevil ethnic group exclusiveness.
After the 1992 General Elections, ethnic violence in several parts of the Rift Valley has continued, on and off. In some areas, acts of intimidation and violence are still targeted at individuals who attempt to return to their land.
7.0 PERPETRATORS OF THE VIOLENCE
Available evidence shows that a shadowy militia called ‘the Kalenjin Warriors’ spearheaded the clashes or attacks. These "warriors" attacked farms inhabited by non-Kalenjin communities such as the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and the Abagusii. These communities were associated with the embryonic opposition Parties, especially the Forum for Restoration of Democracy- FORD (Africa Watch 1993,2). The warriors tended to loot, kill, maim and burn leaving an orgy of death and destruction in their trail.
Prior to any attack leaflets signed by the ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ would be distributed in a given area warning non-Kalenjins, to vacate their homes or risk death (Ibid.).
Thus majority of the attacks were carried out by hordes of marauding men. In most of the operations as many as 1,000 warriors participated (Daily Nation, April 21, 1992, 3).
In the violence- torn areas, as part of ethnic mobilisation the ‘warriors’ adopted Kalenjin symbols such as the use of traditional weapons and war songs. In addition, the attackers were painted with clay markings "munyo" characteristic of markings used during traditional initiation rites. The warriors were attired in traditional Kalenjin costume-half naked with faces painted with white chalk while in some instance they wore an informal uniform of shorts and Tee shirts.
The clashes, therefore, appear not to have been spontaneous but were planned and executed by people who appeared to have a political agenda. The ‘warriors’ were not ordinary people, but a well trained private army comprising of experienced military men who were always in the frontline followed by bow and arrow carrying warriors. Available evidence shows that the ‘warriors’ had undergone some basic military training in the forest (Daily Nation, January 8, 1992,3, the Standard, August 7, 1998, 5). A senior KANU official in Nakuru seemed to confirm the claim of military training of the Kalenjin warriors when he remarked that the youth who were reportedly being ferried into the forest in government lorries were newly circumcised Kalenjin boys who were going to perform their final initiation rites (Daily Nation, January, 3 1992,3).
The Kalenjin warriors were armed with an assortment of traditional weapons such as bows, arrows, spears, clubs etc. In some instances, a few of them were armed with firearms. The raiders appeared to have received some logistic support in carrying out attacks. For example, the security forces tended to remain passive and helpless as the raiders attacked, killed, maimed and destroyed property with impunity hence the feeling of state complicity. Moreover, the warriors appeared to be in radio communication hence their ability to mount attacks and evade the security personnel (Daily Nation, March 17,1992,2).
The warriors appeared to have a central command in their organisation. The perpetrators came in formation, the vanguard armed with bows and arrows who actually spearheaded the attacks and burnt houses. The second formation was the carriers of bows and arrows, and the third comprised of men armed with firearms (Daily Nation, June 6, 1992,5). During the operation there was clear evidence that some warriors were in command and issued orders to the rank and file. The commanders of the warriors wore black and red uniform. They also carried red flags during the day and torches at night (Daily Nation, March 10, 1992,3). The warriors appeared very versatile, a sign of having undergone some basic vigorous training. This was especially evident in their discipline and military - like operations.
Both the Kiliku and the NCCK reports identified senior government ministers and KANU officials as having organised, financed and abetted the mayhem. Available evidence gives credence to this. For example, the attacks were organised under a central command often in collaboration with local administration and security officers. Moreover, warriors were promised immunity from arrest hence they attacked with impunity (Ibid.).
There also occurred retaliatory attacks against the Kalenjin, though less organised and opportunistic in character. This therefore greatly contributed to an escalating cycle of violence of attack and counter attacks.
All in all, the Kalenjin youth seem to have been duped into being used to unleash terror on other communities. This was through extensive political indoctrination by politicians who exploited ethnic differences and greed for land within the community for their own selfish political ends. Fear was instilled in the community of possible persecution or retribution in the event of KANU losing power.
The Kalenjin warriors are reported to have taken oaths (‘Muma’) with the purpose of driving out all non-Kalenjins from the Rift Valley.
8.0 EFFECTS OF THE VIOLENCE
The political violence that continue to rock Kenya since 1991 has had lasting effects, which has altered Kenya’s political and economic landscape.
The violence has created strong fear among the non-KAMATUSA communities in the Rift Valley. This is due to the fact that it contributed to a situation of lawlessness, which put the lives of many people in jeopardy. It led to dislocation of many people from their farms. It is estimated that 400,000 people were displaced during the violence. Although some people have returned to their farms about 200,000 are yet to be re-settled. However, some of the farms have been illegally occupied by Kalenjins some of whom allegedly bought the land at low prices from destitute non-Kalenjins who cannot re-occupy their farms. The Kalenjins are capitalising on the current state of insecurity for their own political and economic advantages.
The violence therefore has engendered a growing atmosphere of hatred and suspicion between communities that hitherto had lived together peacefully and even intermarried.
Consequently, peoples’ self reliance approach to life has been shattered and reduced to the level of destitution and helplessness.
The clashes caused deaths and injuries, internal displacement, destitution and extensive destruction of resources in the affected areas. Serious damage was inflicted to agriculture, economic and social infrastructure including educational and healthcare.
The destruction of farms and displacement of population from a rich agricultural area contributed to serious food shortages in 1993. The Kenyan government therefore had to appeal to the international community for food aid (Daily Nation, May 14, 1993,6). Even today the agricultural production is yet to recover.
The displaced persons have been forced to live in harsh squalid conditions, unhygienic camps, in churches, trading centres without proper sanitation and shelter. The health of the victims have been pathetic ,especially children suffering from malnutrition. Women and children have borne the brunt of the mayhem thereby comprising the bulk of the victims. As Ayot notes: "Wars and conflicts often leave women in situations whereby they can hardly make ends meet. They have little or no resources at all against these acts of violence" (1995,4).
The children have been psychologically traumatised after witnessing the killing of relatives, burning of houses and wanton destruction of property. The education of the majority of the displaced children were disrupted or terminated.
The violence has so far claimed the lives of at least 2,500 people, brutally murdered in cold blood.
To a large extent, the destruction and destabilisation worked to the political and economic advantage of the KANU government. For example, the violence disrupted the 1992 voter’s registration in communities that whole-heartedly
supported the opposition (Kiliku Report 1992). Thus thousands of Kenyans were unable to register as voters or cast their ballots as a result of displacement and destruction caused by the violence.
By and large, the victims of the violence have been conditioned to live in a state of insecurity, apprehensive of possible further attacks. Generally, in the violence ethnicity has been manipulated for political and economic gains. Hence people who had ostensibly lived peacefully and with a degree of interdependence became arch-enemies. For example, the
Rift Valley has been for a long time, the epitome and a melting pot of multi-ethnic co-existence. This has now been ‘fatally’ shattered by the ethnic violence.
Thus it can be correctly said that the building of a new democratic society seem not to be the major concern of politicians whose primary inspiration is to capture and retain political power.
The underlying causes of the violence must be honestly identified instead of merely dealing with the symptoms.
First, the state should come up with a land policy or establish a land commission to look into the issue of land tenure. Kenyans have strong attachment to land hence conflict over land often occur especially due to the rise in population. In Kenya, there are millions of landless people and squatters yet a few tycoons own thousands of acres of land, most of which is not put into use. This often creates resentment.
Secondly, there is urgent need for civic education to enlighten the people to respect the civil liberties of individuals and the need for co-existence. The government, the church and other non- governmental organizations should spearhead this education so that people can understand the nature of political pluralism and other attendant changes in the country.
Thirdly, the culture of intolerance should be eradicated so that the people can comprehend the need for unity in diversity. Each ethnic group has the right to existence and should be treated equally with all the others. All individuals should feel secure in their lives and property.
In addition, there should be equal opportunities in the sharing of the country’s natural and political resources. This can only be achieved through the adoption of democratic style of government, which accommodates everybody, expanding the base of the economy to meet the aspirations of different social groups.
This is turn would create harmony through the recognition of the legitimacy of adversity and cultivating a spirit of tolerance. Moreover, it is only social justice and equality, which can bring about a just peace.
Fourthly, reconciliation efforts should be emphasized so that the wholesale condemnation of an ethnic group should be discarded.
Fifthly, there is urgent need to strengthen and streamline the institutions for conflict resolution. This will ensure that conflicts are solved at the nascent stages before they engulf the whole community.
Sixth, there is need to provide compensation or some form of restitution for the violence victims.
Seventh, allegations of state officials’ complicity in the mayhem should be thoroughly investigated and appropriate action taken where necessary.
10.0 CONCLUSION
The violence that has characterised the Kenyan political and social scene seems to have been the result of a deliberate manipulation and instigation by the state. The immediate causes of the violence were political rather than ethnic. Indeed, other causes advanced such as land disputes, cattle rustling seemed far- fetched, which merely served as a camouflage to sustain the conflict.
The study contends that the upsurge of violence provides a real challenge to the process of democratisation and governance. It is worth noting that ethnic consciousness seems to have become more pronounced since the advent of political pluralism. Consequently, Kenyan politics is primarily hinged on ethnicity and not ideology. This tends to support Bayart’s contention of the so called ‘politics of the belly’. In Kenya people vote along ethnic lines during elections hoping that if one of their members wins the elections then it would be their turn to eat. Thus the major cause of violence in Africa is the struggle by different ethnic groups for the control of the state apparatus and the power accruing from
it. Leaders therefore tend to use ethnicity to divided and perpetuate their rule.
The study, therefore, shows the link between politics, violence and ethnicity. It notes that people who have co-existed peacefully for may years have now become arch-rivals, ready to use lethal weapons against each other with untold results.
The violence has had far- reaching implications to the Kenyan body politic. There is strong evidence that the state was partisan in its intervention in the ethnic violence. The state cannot escape censure and blame for the mayhem. This is because it is the duty of the state to ensure the safety of all its citizens.
The study therefore posits that the democratisation process in Kenya has been impeded by forces of political violence.
All in all the study concludes that the mayhem in Kenya is manifestation of the use of violence as a political tool.
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Ethnicity and its implications on Humanity in Kenya
with special reference to Women
BY
HADIJA MURENGA
Introduction
This paper attempts an analysis of the concept of ethnicity, changes involved (associated) in it and its implications on humanity with a bias to women in Africa. The paper adopts a sociological perspective with a few citations of theological references where applicable.
The word ethnicity is derived from the word ethnic which is a greek terminology known as Ethnos or Ethnikos which simply means tribes or human types belonging to a race or kind. Kornblum (1991: 418) defines an Ethnic group as a population that has a sense of group identity based on shared ancestry and distinctive cultural patterns.
Ethnic groups can either exist in majority or minority and within ethnic groups there exists a long standing association across generations also there exists complex relationships such as kinships, a common culture, a common territory and religious affiliations.
From the above definitions, ethnicity simply means a group that has some common characteristics in terms of common kinship origins, cultural origins and territorial origins. It is a group with salient features. Ethnicity can therefore be defined as a form of tribal consciousness that makes a member believe that he is part of an ethnic group.
There are two characteristics that makes a member’s consciousness. One is the distinct language in order to see itself different from another. Another characteristic is distinct political institution and territory. Offsprings are therefore brought up to accept the distinct characteristics.
Ethnic group is a cultural phenomenon even though it is based originally on a common perception and believes that are favourable or unfavourable.
According to this paper, ethnicity can be summed up as:-
2. The ethnic group is based on a commonness of subjective fears. This could be of its existence in society and other groups or origins.
3. Material deprivation is another characteristic that is fertile for the growth of ethnicity.
4. The ethnic group does not have to be a race. It’s seen by others as inferior. However, there is a very strong overlap that groups can organize themselves ethnically and are often referred by others as a race thus an overlap between racism and ethnicity. Ethnicity includes some level of tribal bias.
5. Ethnicity may be used for [any number of purpose[s] as a political instrument to bring about political unity or political chaos or to foster hostility among tribes.
6. Ethnicity may become an instrument of division to the extent that it may be associated with class stratification.
It should be noted that from the above definition of the term ethnicity, sociologically it cannot be discussed in isolation, other concepts such as race inequality and stratification also come into play. In other words sociologically, ethnicity is closely related to aspects such as race, inequality and stratification.
This paper will not however go into defining of the terms race, inequality and stratification at this introductory point, but these terms will be defined in the discussion part of this paper as various aspects of ethnicity are unraveled.
Today, the phenomenon of globalization has become a social reality in the world round. No region in the world can claim to live in autarchy. That is something of the past. Globalization brings with it intensified international relations which has created an increasingly interdependent world in all areas, be it economic, social, political, ideological, cultural, technological, ecological. . . . . . including internal security of states (CODESRIA BULLETIN. NO. 3, 1997).
Globalization which was formerly rather rational, now intends to turn structural. Even though its not progressing at the same speed in all areas, its structural character is crudely felt through social systems and has an invariable influence on social policies as a whole.
Africa has not stood aside this globalization process. After independence, Africa entered an era of certainty of progress and could enjoy the improvement in African people’s living conditions. For instance, in the social arena, educational and health infrastructures existed both in towns and in the countryside.
This paper will not pretend to join the ‘agro-optimistic’ controversy about globalization. It joins the ‘agro-pessimistic’ stand. Therefore, this paper assumes that, as a whole though the globalization process has had both positive and negative impacts on social policy in Africa, the negative one is likely important.
The mention of the word Ethnicity or Ethnic group causes shiver and fear to some people in Africa, while to some it is traumatizing. This paper does not as a matter of fact try to deny that the word/term Ethnicity/Ethnic groups did exist before in the African traditional set up. According to anthropologist Fortes and Pritchard (1940), the traditional African Political systems were tribal in nature.
Nanda (1987 : 288) acknowledges the existence of political organizations on tribal basis. Nanda contends that, using social complexity as a standard, anthropologists have divided the traditional African political organization into your major types – band societies, tribal societies, chiefdoms and states. They are in the order of their complexity.
For the purpose of this paper, tribal societies are essential. A tribe is a culturally distinct population whose members think of themselves as descended from the same ancestor or part of the same "people" [Nanda 1987 : 290]. Tribes occur primarily among pastoralists and horticulturalists and they are integrated economically by both reciprocity and redistribution. Like bands, tribes are basically egalitarian, with no important difference among members in wealth, status, and power.
Traditional Society, Ethnicity, and its Implications and the place of women
In traditional societies ethnic animosity existed but it was regulated (checked). The societal norms and values (dos and don’ts) really checked the level of ethnic animosity between tribes. Ethnic conflicts have not started today, they were experienced even in the traditional societies.
The only difference is that in traditional societies violence between groups was amicably solved by elders unlike today when peace is not forthcoming.
In the traditional society, communities depended on each other for survival. This could be through peaceful negotiation or through force. Among the Rendile community of Northern Kenya, although they depend on raiding in other communities like the Borana to get herds of livestock in order to have enough food to eat, to pay dowry and to maintain their families, they try as much as possible to avoid killing a person from another community who is not a warrior. Anyone who does so is considered spoiled and has to be cleaned before being admitted into the main camp where they live [Rigano/1997:28] contends that: "…any person who has killed a human being is considered unclean, unromantic and cannot be let into the main village which elders think is a holy, clean place. The Rendile believe that if such elements are allowed they will bring evil spirits".
Such a person is therefore built a small hut outside the main village where he lives until he is cleaned traditionally in a ceremony where a black, castrated, male sheep, camel mild and new clothes are used.
The Samburu community of Northern Kenya has over the years been involved in several armed conflicts with neighbouring communities (thus ethnic wars). The main reasons for these conflicts in the past were livestock animals and/or grazing land. During times when those armed conflicts took place, women, children and captives were never killed. Lesakali (1997) asserts that,
"Samburu warriors attached great prestige to animals brought from the "enemy" territory. This in return created a vicious cycle where there were always raids and counter raids. Needless to say, many people died in such raids. It is important to mention here that even during those raids, the women and children were never killed. Some girls were taken captives and married and they become part of the community" [Lesakali, 1997 : 43 – 4].
Looking at the Maasai community, it comprises of various sections which speak one language called "Olmaa" and they are spread between them and neighbouring communities like the Kamba and the Kikuyu, children and women were not killed. Muriuki (1974) and Kenyatta (1938) state that even when serious armed conflicts were going on, trade expeditions headed by Kikuyu women going into and out of Maasailand went on uninterrupted. Infact, to ensure the security of the women traders, the Maasai warriors would escort the women from their country to their border with the Kikuyu. Historically, there was interdependence of pastoral and non – pastoral communities particularly in times of draught, epidemic and other disasters (See Muriuki, 1974, for pastoral Maasai/Kikuyu relations, e.g. Hedlund 1979).
In the Maasai community what is more important is the respect which is accorded captives of war during armed conflicts between the various sections of the community. When the "enemy" warriors are subdued, they cut grass and hold it up as a sign to show that they have surrendered. Grass is very important in the Maasai environment because their livelihood depends mainly on its availability for their livestock. Nkitoria Oles Sekuda (1997) states that:
(Sekuda 1997; 88)
Equally, women and girls are accorded a lot of respect during times of internal armed conflict. The Maasai women and particularly the mothers or warriors who are called Noon’ gotony ilmuran are so revered that no warriors would dare hurt them. Infact, during times of armed conflict, women are sometimes the best people to bring peace. Sekuda (1997:59) confirms that:
The Kisii and Kalenjin communities in Kenya have also been involved in many conflicts. However, during such conflicts, women and children from either side could cross over to the enemy land, be fed and provided with accommodation.
Wounded warriors from either side or those who fell sick or surrendered to the "enemy" were led and looked after until they were fit to go back to their respective communities.
The few cases we have cited above will represent the other African traditional governments/tribal societies. This is because inspite of diversities in culture, historical dynamics of both adapting and diffusion through trade and conquest resulted in a lot of uniformity. Diffusion of innovations and incorporation of many cultural traits among linguistically and socially different people seemed to have occurred in various degrees as a result of frequent population movements across ethnic boundaries. Were (1985:7) states that:
Liyong (1972:viii) comes to a similar conclusion and states that:
From what we have discussed above, we can conclude this sub – section by saying that, the traditional societies in Kenya (indeed Africa) had almost a universal way of solving/regulating Ethnic conflicts. Nanda (1987 – 294) concurs with this papers conclusion when she writes that tribes depend a great deal on informal ways of controlling deviant behaviour and settling conflicts, but they have also developed more formal mechanisms of control.
The role of politics in Ethnicity
As we have mentioned earlier in this paper, ethnic conflicts between tribes/ethnic groups is not a new phenomenon with the recent political organizations. The only difference is that the traditional societies had a way of resolving such tribal conflicts. The question this paper raises is; is there a convincing mechanism or resolving ethnic conflicts today? Are the causes of such conflicts established transparently?
The ethnicity implications that this paper is addressing are those which have resulted from the effects of globalization. The dictation of terms by IMF and World Bank to developing countries like Kenya has left behind painful and ugly incidences to look at. The globalization process as we said earlier in the paper create an increasingly interdependent world in all areas – political. The third world (e.g. Kenya) are always on the receiving end in the whole process. This has its own effects.
Kenyans until the repeal of section 2 (A) of the constitution which led to the formation of opposition political parties had at least enjoyed the one party political system. We cannot say that one party system was without demerits but at least violence, suffering and crying was somehow contained.
One is tempted to say that the ethnic problems that many Kenyans are faced with such as ethnic clashes are political oriented. The reason behind all these ethnic problem is "political greed". (this is mainly based on ethnic groups wanting to be the ones in power and managing all sources of the national cake). It is only after the World Bank and IMF had threatened to stop AID to Kenya that the government officially announced the repeal of section 2(a) of the constitution leading to the formation of opposition political parties in Kenya in 1991. This demand was not only for Kenya, it applied to so many other developing countries and almost all countries in Africa – Uganda, Zimbambwe, Agola, Nigeria, Zaire etc. The new move of multi – partism in Kenya was a period that Kenyans all over the country welcomed with so much enthusiasm (Njoroge 1997:51). Come the multi – party elections of 1992, most Kenyans went to the polls with a single aim at heart; to remove the government of the day from power. This reaction can push an observer to call it ‘mere excitement’.
It should be noted that the aim of the voters was a mistake, as people did not base their voting on programmes for national reconstruction, but rather, on their political affiliations. During this time, what mattered was not the policies a candidate stood for, but the party he belonged to and this basically meant voting for parties.
When it came to campaigning period, most of the opposition candidates were often than not denied licences to address campaign rallies or had denied licences at the last minute without proper explanations from the government. Further, the campaigns were marred by violence in the name of party rivalry. Rivalry between the parties was totally miconstructed.
It should be noted that rivalry should not be war but competition. We must resist that attempt to make political rivalry a sort of civil war (ethnic clashes) fought with new kinds of weapon. By emphasizing that what divides Kenya is stronger than what unites it, the regime in power seeks to justify the excess and the justice of their attacks.
What we have discussed above is only a summary of a flash back of what happened with the introduction of multipartism in Kenya in 1991. Apparently many Kenyans did not learn after the 1992 elections, come the recent 1997 elections, history repeated itself but this time around there were even more opposition parties than in 1992. the result as it is almost a routine now with the Kenyan politics was fresh ethnic clashes, causing bloodshed, bitterness, nonstop crying and so on.
Every innovation has its own side effects. This paper is looking at multi-partyism politics as an innovation. This simply means that it is a foreign ideology. In fact it was not the Kenyan’s wish/idea to have multi – partyism.
The multi – partyism based on ethnic groups in Kenya has not yielded positive results. As we had stated earlier in the introduction, ethnicity may be used for a number of purposes as a political instrument to bring about political unity or political chaos or to foster hostility among tribes. The later aspect of this is what Kenyans are experiencing. Multi – partyism chaos and hostility among Kenya tribes. Though not yet confirmed, lately one can say that, that multi-partyism is the source of political problems, social unrest and economic disruption in Kenya. It has left the citizens in a state of wonder.
Ethnicity is not only a problem in Kenya, but Africa as a whole. The issue of ethnicity as a problem in Africa became real in the post independent era (Daily Nation, 19th July, 1994). Ethnic sentiments can fragment the solidarity of the nation/state particularly when ethnic beliefs tend to conserve irrational patterns of behaviour then we have situation created for ethnic chaos. In fact on the positive of ethnicity, not much can be said in post independent Africa because ethnic groups are in chaos or crisis. Cases in point include Angola, Zimbambwe, Zaire, Nigeria and Rwanda among others. In all these countries the issue of ethnicity had left devastating memories.
In Kenya, the major problem that has been blamed on ethnicity is the so called "ethnic land clashes". But the question that no one seems to know an answer to is, "What exactly is the root cause of these clashes?
Different ethnic groups and individuals have blamed one another for the ethnic clashes in Kenya. Whether or not the cause of the clashes is known is not an issue now, what is important and is necessary are the possible solutions. Why, because the results of the clashes were/are bad. Many people lost their lives, particularly in the Rift Valley. Enough people were rendered homeless, and note that, most of the people suffer major injuries – deep cuts in the heads, quite a number were disfigured. Worse of it all, children and women were seriously hurt. Some women were raped, and of course the implications of this act are not simple, more so in this ear of AIDS.
Though the ethnic clashes have in a way been blamed, there are still new cases emerging like the cattle raids between the Pokot and Turkana, Pokot and Marakwet (Daily Nation, July 7th 1998). These raids have also left a number of people dead and rendered many homeless.
There is a lot of suspicion between individuals, politicians, and ethnic groups that any attempt to resolve the problems created by ethnicity in Kenya are either brushed aside as no resolution at all or in such forums of creating peace another life is lost.
The government for example has tried to restore peace in the country and particularly in land ethnic clashes zones but this has taken suspiciously by some people or groups based on certain reasons.
Njoroge (1997:7) assert that, the government has not spared any efforts to persuade public opinion that the opposition leaders called the so – called ethnic clashes in some parts of the country. Thus, we can say that the root cause of the clashes is not known what is said is just speculation. The Catholic bishops pointed that, it is difficult to believe that the government made every effort to put a stop to the violence: I quote the Catholic bishops publication:
Still on the issue of suspicion when resolutions to ethnic clashes are being sought is the fact that, recently, in the local dailies, three Members of Parliament were reported to have said that, the move by the government to establish a Commission of inquiry to investigate ethnic clashes is suspect. The Democratic party legislators are reported to have said that:
The legislators said, such a commission had a narrow mandate and people would not volunteer to give information. Infact according to them, the government by creating the commission, was not sincere and "only wanted to take the center stage and be seen as the initiator" of the move to establish the truth behind the tribal clashes that rocked the country in 1992 and this year.
The issue of suspicion in trying to resolve ethnic crisis is not only in Kenya. The local dailies also reported a similar case in Uganda. Daily Nation, June 26th, 1998 had an article titled "many question Museveni’s army ability to fight rebels – I quote:-
This is an indication that there is not only trouble in Kenya in relation to ethnic clashes, but also elsewhere in Africa. In the above case of rebel attacks in Uganda, at least 80 perished when rebels set fire to dormitories after the students refused to join them. Another 100 were abducted. Hell knows what happened to them there after.
There being so much suspicion in people’s mind when solutions to ethnic clashes are being sought, we can prematurely conclude that a solution will not be found soon yet we need one. Therefore, there is need for neutral organization like the church to come with a solution. At least, the response of the church is positive in trying to restore peace in the country. Regarding the issue of ethnic clashes, the NCCK in the Daily Nation July, 7th 1998 was reported to have promised to make submissions on the clashes based on studies it has carried out over the years when the commission meets.
In brief, Kenyan ethnic communities had better forget their ethnic "otherness" because by concentrating too much on how they have been marginalized by a perceived dominant group, they are in essence entranching the selfishness of the dominating category and forgetting to forge their own indentity.
Ethnicity and Inequality
This paper addresses the issue of social inequality. Social inequality emanates from the levels of share and distribution of resources and privileges among members of society, such that, if these levels vary enormously or slightly then we say equality does not exist. The degree of inequality varies from one society to another and one time to another.
Among the various aspects of inequality experienced in different societies, ethnicity is one. Looking at various ethnic groups, there is a relationship between and inequality particularly if one compares regional inequality and ethnic residence. Low endowed ethnic regions are poor.
Inequality is also realized when we consider the ethnicity aspect of sharing of the national cake. Some ethnic groups have a better advantage of access to national power hence enhancing income accumulation compared to others. This also brings inequality.
From observation and experiences from the presenter’s friends and acquaintances, the issue of ethnicity and inequality has very negative implications. With the difficult economic situation in Kenya, a lot of people particularly women are indulging into very dirty means of earning a living. It seems like the ethnic group in power has access to massive wealth, this has attracted many young and even older ladies into temptations. They have fallen victims to the sexually hungry, wealthy men. Some of them are victims of casual sex for pay, while others have conveniently got married in order to survive. (What is alarming is the issue of indiscriminate sex particularly in this ear of AIDS. Many of the women have been infected, sorry to mention but quite a number have died.
The issue of concubinage has also increased due to social inequality in our society. The same "wealthy men" have been targeted by women from other ethnic groups who have not had an equal share of the national cake. A friend of mine (name with held) a single lady has vowed that she must be married by a man from the ethnic group of power. According to her, the right husbands at the moment are from that ethnic group. A question one may ask is whether if a different ethnic group came into power today, the same lady would leave her husband and marry one from the new ethnic groups in power.
Ethnicity and Economic Activities
Ethnicity has not only caused political instability in Kenya, it has also destabilized economy. When we talk about a people without a stable economy, we are directly or indirectly introducing the issue of poverty. Poverty has claimed several lives in Africa, leave alone Kenya. Somali is a case in hand. Poverty also leaves a lot of people miserable – emaciated and hopeless.
The ethnic clashed that were experienced in Kenya in 1992 and early this year rendered so many people homeless (Daily Nation, February, 1998). This means that many people were displaced, thus they could not continue with their day to day economic activities.
The fact that Kenya’s economy is unstable means that everyone in the country together with the government should be trying as much as possible to look for possible solutions to revitalize the economy. But that is not the case because we still read or hear of cattle raids in parts of the country such as Pokot, Marakwet and Turkana (Daily Nation, July 7th 1998).Cattle raiding can really disrupt a community’s economy given that such a community relies on livestock farming as a means of survival. The raids have left many people homeless, others have lost their lives and of course many are seriously injured. The worst result of raid is starvation which may leave enough people dead and others helplessly in need.
Another consequence of cattle raids like ethnic land clashes, is that, the affected people will have to look for alternative means of survival. Experience has shown that, most women and girls in such circumstances will end up in dubious means of earning a living such as prostitution. This has very negative implications – some victims have contracted sexual transmitted diseases including AIDS while other have fallen victims of unwanted pregnancies.
In short something has to be done to restore peace and stability in all spheres of life – political, social, economical or psychological.
Church and Ethnicity
The Church has not been left out in the issue of ethnicity. Most churches in Kenya today are ethnic oriented. For instance, Presbyterian church of East Africa (P.C.E.A) is dominated by Kikuyus, Akorino is also dominated by Kikuyus, Legio Maria by Luos, Seventh Day is dominated by the Kisii and the Luo. Pentecostal Assemblies of God (P.A.G) is dominated by the Luhyia.
From experience and friend’s experience, the church leaders at times forget that there are also other members who may not be from the majority ethnic group in the church. At times preaching or general announcements are done in the dominant ethnic languages.
Thus, the rest fail to know how to behave. One wonders whether such leaders are serious or not. This has brought about "religious nomadism" – moving from one church to another looking for spiritual satisfaction. In some cases, leaders have ended up battling their differences out physically. Also it is due to ethnic animosity in churches that other types of churches such as revival churches are coming up as a solution. They are serving as neutral grounds for the faithfuls who have failed to get satisfaction elsewhere.
The Response of the church to ethnicity and its implications
The issue of ethnicity carries with it a lot of negative implication in Kenya and in Africa as a whole. Unlike the peaceful old ethnicity which yielded peace and unity between tribes/ethnic groups, the current ethnicity is associated with animosity between ethnic groups. With a lot of Kenyans having lost their lives in ethnic clashes judicial commissions and parliamentary selects committees being set up to investigate them, the church has not stayed out of it (Daily Nation, July 12th , 1998).
Since time immemorial the church is associated with peace. Indeed with the negative impact of ethnicity persisting, the church has started her fight against tribalism with urgency. Although the church is not supposed to get involved into politics directly, she will not sit bank and watch humanity perish (Daily Nation June 28th, 1998). The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) is really on the frontline in initiating peace in the
country. For example, Daily Nation July 7th, 1998 (report that the NCCK questioned the sincerity of the government is setting up a judicial commission to investigate causes of politically – instigated clashes in the country including those that occurred in 1990 – 91.
This implies that there is suspicion among Kenyans despite the fact that the government is setting up commissions to investigate causes of ethnic clashes in parts of the country. NCCK had this to say:
However, the organization said it hoped the move by the government signaled serious commitment by the authorities that clashes would not recur. It asked the authorities to "openly and honestly" address other issues related issues such as resettlement and preparation in favour of the victims.
Generally, the church has done a lot to initiate peace, give hope and offer material assistance to the victims of ethnic clashes in Kenya. First, abundance of prayers have been made calling for peace in the country and more so in the ethnic clashes zones. A lot of faithfuls have fasted so that peace can be restored in the ethnic clashes zones in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa – Rwanda, Nigeria, Somali etc. The church allover the world is preaching peace and reconciliation . This includes the street preachers.
The Church has played a major role of giving support to the clash victims. An example is the Catholic Church in Nakuru – Christ the King Cathedral and Lamdiac Catholic Church in Njoro. At least from experience, the two churches offered accommodation to the ethnic clashes victims both in 1990 – 91 and 1998. The two churches among others have continued to resettle the victims of ethnics clashes. The church not only resettles the victims but she is struggling to ensure that at least the victims are just a bit comfortable. Thus, they issue them with clothing, blankets, utensils (sufurias and plates) and food
Whenever it is available. All these are from Christian well-wishers.
The Church has her own organization which are looking into the issue of ethnic land clashes among other violence related issues so as to come up with means and ways of restoring peace in the country. For example, in the daily nation July 7th, 1998 it was reported that the NCCK will make submissions on the clashes based on studies it has carried out over the years when the commission meets (peace initiative commission). This shows the concern that the church has with regard to ethnic clashes.
Catholic church is also very active in fighting for peace. There is the Catholic church justice and peace commission. From personal experience it was very active in restoring/initiating peace during this years general elections. They were among the observers.There are also Christian based NGOs such as "Africa for peace" whose main purpose is to restore peace in Africa. Recently they have been trying to resolve conflict in the Western part of Kenya. Precisely, the NGO has been mediating between the Marakwet and the Pokot from the above examples of the role of the Church in initiating peace where ethnicity has planted animosity, it is clear that church is fully involved in making peace. Therefore we can say that Christians have a duty to ensure that God’s peace prevails in the world. According to Owuor (1998), when this is actualized, there will be no more mourning or sadness that is common today as a result of ethnic conflicts.
Conclusion
In this paper it is concluded that ethnicity has created a lot of negativity in the society and its end result is traumatizing.During ethnic clashes for example, humanity suffer in general but women, girls and children in particular suffer traumatizing consequences – rape. This affect them both psychologically and emotionally. In short, there is need for a solution to ethnic animosity. The government, the church, NGOs, and individual Kenyan citizens should see to it that a solution to ethnic animosity is reached. People should forget their ethnic differences and work as a team towards searching for a lasting solution to ethnic – based problems.
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